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In a series of recent cases, the ECJ laid the foundations for a new system of
international social security protection. European social security legislation in
principle designates one Member State as competent, thereby freeing all
others from social security responsibilities. For instance, the posting rules
entitle workers to carry out work temporarily in a Member State while
remaining exclusively subject to the social security legislation of their home
State. Disregarding the applicable European and national provisions, the ECJ
ruled that, under certain circumstances, a posted worker can also claim
benefits under the social security scheme of the host Member State.1 The ECJ
thereby imposes additional social security responsibilities on Member States
other than the competent State, allowing a migrant to gain access
simultaneously to the social security systems of two or more Member States.
Of course, all non-competentMember States are not bound to grant all their
benefits to all claimants. The ECJ accordingly devised a new allocation of
social security duties, based on a double mechanism. Firstly, the ECJ lifts the
prohibition on the Member States lacking competence to apply their
legislation; such States are henceforth allowed to grant benefits to uninsured
persons at their own volition. The Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak cases however
clarify that they are able to exclude persons from the benefit of their social
security system only if, in doing so, they comply with the principle of
proportionality. Thus, that principle opens a second gate to the judge-made
system of social protection.
This contribution describes this exercise in social engineering and its
practical and theoretical consequences. Before broaching the innovative case
law, the traditional system of social protection which it supplements is
outlined. Next, both branches are explained as flowing from respectively a
new understanding of the doctrine of pre-emption and a new conception of the
* PhD Fellow of the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO), Ghent University, Social Law
Department.
1. Joined Cases C-611 & 612/10, Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak, judgment of 12 June 2012,
nyr.
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principle of proportionality rooted in the case law on Union citizenship.After
describing their effects in terms of rights and duties, their constitutional
implications for the hierarchy of norms in European social security law are set
out. This article aims at determining the social security duties of Member
States that do not flow from the provisions of secondary law and thereby
answer the question what it means for a State not to be competent.
1.1. Conflict rules and substantive rules
The Member States retain the power to organize their social security systems,
provided that they comply with the provisions of European law in force.2They
use both internal and external conditions to open and close the scope of their
schemes. Some requirements, such as age-limits for family benefits, have no
specific impact upon migrants. From an internal market perspective, there is
little need to regulate such “internal conditions”.
Member States attune the personal scope of their social security systems to
what they consider to be their circle of solidarity. Persons having a connection
with their society which warrants inclusion in that circle, and only those,
should be afforded social security protection. This privileged connection is
formalized through “external conditions”, themost common of which confine
protection to personswho reside or work in the territory of the State concerned
(and their family members). External conditions have an including and an
excluding function: members of the solidaristic community are protected
against social security risks and liable to contribute to the funding of the
corresponding schemes; others are refused rights and free from duties. Such
conditions particularly affect migrants. When external conditions deny
migrants social security benefits (exclusionary dimension) or impose
contribution duties upon them (inclusionary dimension), they may raise
obstacles to the free movement of persons. Two types of obstacles must be
distinguished.
Firstly, it may be unclear which social security legislation applies to a
migrant. For instance, a frontier worker residing in Member State A and
working in Member State B would be insured twice if Member State A
considers all its residents to be insured, while the social security legislation of
Member State B includes all persons who are economically active within its
territory (i.e. a positive conflict of laws).This double inclusion entails a double
burden, as frontier workers would be liable to contribute to the funding of the
social security schemes of both States. Conversely, a lack of insurance would
arise for a frontier worker habitually residing in Member State B and
2. E.g. Case 275/81, Koks, [1982] ECR 3013, para 10; Case C-137/11, Partena, judgment
27 Sept. 2012, para 59.
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employed in Member State A (i.e. a negative conflict of laws). The combined
excluding conditions of the two States in question would leave the frontier
worker without social security protection and hence constitute an obstacle to
free movement. This question of competence calls for an intervention of
European law, which vests competence with the one Member State to which a
person is deemed to be most closely connected.
Once competence has been allocated to a single Member State, that State’s
legislation must be applied. The external conditions laid down in that
legislation might however raise an obstacle to free movement, particularly if
they exclude migrants from social security benefits. For instance, the
competent Member State of employment may suspend the payment of family
benefits because the frontier worker and the members of his family reside
abroad. This is the question of entitlement.
AsAdvocate GeneralMazák opined, the distinction between the question of
the competence of a Member State with regard to a particular benefit and the
question of the actual entitlement to a benefit is “the key to a proper
understanding” of the case law discussed here.3 European law addresses the
issues by means of two regulations (basic Reg. 1408/71 and implementing
Reg. 574/72), whichwere recently replaced by a new generation of regulations
(basic Reg. 883/2004 and implementing Reg. 987/2009)4 laying down a
system of coordination that “adjust[s] social security schemes in relation to
each other (as well as to those of international regulations) in order to regulate
transnational questions, with the objective of protecting the social security
position of migrants”.5
The question of competence is solved through European conflict rules. In
general, these subject economically active persons to the legislation of their
place of activity and economically inactive persons to the laws of the Member
State in which they reside. As demonstrated, if that question were left to
3. Opinion of A.G. Mazák in Case C-352/06, Bosmann, [2008] ECR I-3827, para 56. This
distinction between “Kollisionsnormen” and “Sachnormen”, which finds its origin in
international private law, is well-established in the German literature on international social
security law (e.g. Devetzi, Die Kollisionsnormen des Europäischen Sozialrechts (Duncker und
Humblot, 2000), pp. 121–198; Eichenhofer, Sozialrecht der Europäischen Union, 4th ed. (Erich
SchmidtVerlag, 2010), pp. 111–114) and reverberates in some ECJ cases (see e.g. Case 101/83,
Brusse, [1984] ECR 2223, para 28; Case 302/84, Ten Holder, [1986] ECR 1821).
4. Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons
and their families moving within the Community, O.J. 1971, L 149/2; Regulation 574/72 fixing
the procedure for implementing Regulation 1408/71, O.J. 1972, L 74/1; Regulation 883/2004
on the coordination of social security systems, O.J. 2004, L 166/1; Regulation 987/2009 laying
down the procedure for implementing Regulation 883/2004, O.J. 2009, L 284/1. They are now
complemented by Directive 2011/24 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border
healthcare, O.J. 2011, L 88/45.
5. Pennings, European Social Security Law, 5th ed. (Intersentia, 2010), p. 6.
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national discretion, some persons might be insured in more than one Member
State, while others would not be insured at all. These consequences are best
avoided through a harmonization of the conflict rules. The question of
competence is governed solely by the conflict rules of the Regulations,6 which
provide a complete and uniform set of conflict rules7 in order to “prevent the
simultaneous application of a number of national legislative systems and the
complications which might ensue, but also to ensure that the persons covered
by Regulation No 1408/71 are not left without social security cover because
there is no legislation which is applicable to them”.8
This aim is attained by ascribing two interwoven qualities to the European
conflict rules. Firstly, they designate one Member State. That country is
compelled to apply its legislation and cannot rely on any rule that provides
otherwise. For instance, if the Member State of employment is competent
according to the Regulation, that State cannot decline its competence with
respect to non-resident workers on the grounds that it applies only to
residents.9 This so-called “compulsory” or “strong effect” of the European
conflict rules overrules dissonant national conflict rules.10 The “prohibitive”
or “exclusive effect” of the European provisions determining the applicable
legislation ensures that only one legislation applies. The exclusivity principle
laid down in Article 13(1) Regulation 1408/71 and Article 11(1) Regulation
883/2004 means that Member States lacking competence under the European
conflict rules are not allowed to apply their social security legislation, either to
levy contributions (the Perenboom case)11 or to award benefits (the Ten
Holder case).12 Hence, unless the Regulation provides otherwise, only one
State’s legislation applies at any given point in time. Exceptions expressly laid
6. Art. 13(1) Regulation 1408/71 and Art. 11(1) Regulation 883/2004. See also e.g. Case
276/81, Kuijpers, [1982] ECR 3027, para 14.
7. Ten Holder, cited supra note 3, para 21; Case 60/85, Luijten, [1986] ECR 2365, para 14;
Case C-2/89, Kits van Heijningen, [1990] ECR I-1755, para 12; Case C-196/90, De Paep,
[1991] ECR I-4815, para 18; Case C-71/93, Van Poucke, [1994] ECR I-1101, para 22; Case
C-425/93, Calle Grenzshop Andresen, [1995] ECR I-269, para 9; Case C-131/95, Huijbrechts,
[1997] ECR I-1409, para 17; Case C-275/96, Kuusijärvi, [1998] ECR I-3419, para 28; Case
C-202/97, Fitzwilliam, [2000] ECR I-883, para 20; Case C-404/98, Plum, [2000] ECR I-9379,
para 18; Case C-302/02, Laurin Effing, [2005] ECR I-553, para 38; Case C-115/11, Format,
judgment of 4 Oct. 2012, nyr, para 29.
8. Kits van Heijningen, ibid., para 12, repeated in, inter alia, De Paep, ibid., para 18.
9. Kits van Heijningen, ibid., paras. 20–22.
10. Kuijpers, cited supra note 6;Kits van Heijningen, ibid., paras. 20–22 and operative part;
De Paep, cited supra note 7, paras. 18–21 and operative part; Case C-347/10, Salemink,
judgment of 17 Jan. 2012, nyr, paras. 40–42.
11. Case 102/76, Perenboom, [1977] ECR 815. See also Case C-60/93, Aldewereld, [1994]
ECR I-2991; Case C-34/98,Commission v.France (CRDS), [2000] ECR I-995; Case C-169/98,
Commission v. France (CSG), [2000] ECR I-1049.
12. Ten Holder, cited supra note 3.
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down in the Regulations delegate some parcels of competence to other
Member States in order to meet (usually benefit-)specific needs.13The virtues
of the principle of exclusivity are manifold. The ECJ constantly refers to the
need to avoid the complications which might ensue from the concurrent
application of several national legislative systems.14 Besides, the principle is
“aimed specifically at eliminating unequal treatment which is the
consequence of partial or total overlapping of the legislation”.15 Indeed,
persons liable to contributions under the legislation of a non-competent
Member State in addition to their duties in the competent State suffer a
discriminatory disadvantage as compared with persons who are subject only
to the non-competent State’s social security system.16 The principle of
exclusivity also contributes to legal certainty.17 It thus serves “the interests of
both workers and employers as much as of insurance funds”18 and facilitates
the free movement of employed and self-employed persons within the
Union.19
Just like the substantive rules of the Regulation, the conflict rules must
comply with the Treaty provisions on free movement. In the past, the ECJ has
used theTreaty as a benchmark to interpret the conflict rules, sometimes even
contra legem,20 and to test their validity.21
Once the applicable legislation has been determined by the conflict rules,
the substantive questions of rights (benefits) and duties (contributions) must
be answered. These questions are governed by both national and European
law, i.e. the social security Regulations and, to a certain extent, the free
movement provisions of the TFEU. The Member States have the power to
shape their social security schemes.As long as they observe EU law, they keep
control over most constitutive aspects of their systems, such as the conditions
creating the right or the obligation to become affiliated to a social security
13. See e.g. Case C-372/02, Adanez-Vega, [2004] ECR I-10761, para 19 et seq.
14. See e.g. the cases referred to in note 7 supra, on the understanding that the relevant
paragraphs of Ten Holder and Luijten are respectively para 19 and para 12. This case law is
codified in recital 8 in the preamble to Regulation 1408/71 and recital 15 in the preamble to
Regulation 883/2004.
15. Commission v. France (CRDS), cited supra note 11, para 46 and Commission v. France
(CSG), cited supra note 11, para 43; see also Case C-249/04, Allard, [2005] ECR I-4535, para
31; Case C-493/04, Piatkowski, [2006] ECR I-2369, para 21.
16. See Commission v. France (CRDS), cited supra note 11, paras. 45–48 and Commission
v. France (CSG), cited supra note 11, paras. 42–45.
17. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 67.
18. Case 19/67, van der Vecht, [1967] ECR (English spec. ed.) 345, at 353.
19. Allard, cited supra note 15, paras. 31–32.
20. E.g. Case 1/85,Miethe, [1986] ECR 1837. See also Case C-443/11, Jeltes, judgment of
11 April 2013, nyr.
21. Case 41/84, Pinna I, [1986] ECR 1 (invalid); Case C-242/99, Vogler, [2000] ECR
I-9083 (valid); Joined Cases C-393 & 394/99, Hervein II, [2002] ECR I-2829 (valid).
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scheme or to a particular branch under such a scheme;22 the conditions for the
acquisition, retention, loss or suspension of the right to social security
benefits;23 and the method of calculating their amount.24 The European
intrusion into national regulatory autonomy is targeted: only those external
norms which conflict with the overarching instrument are set aside. For
instance, Article 7 Regulation 883/2004 requires States to “export” their cash
benefits to beneficiaries residing in another Member State. The European
legislation falls short of harmonizing national social security law: all internal
rules and some external rules are determined by national law only.
That explains why coordination is said to be neutral.25 Given the residual
powers of the Member States, the landscape of social security law is diverse.
Therefore, movement entailing a change in the connecting factor (the place of
(self-)employment or residence) triggers a change in applicable legislation,
which in turn leads to a different set of social security rights and duties. This
package may be more or less favourable than the one applying prior to the
switch in applicable legislation.The ECJ repeatedly underscored that a shift to
a less favourable legislation may in principle be compatible with the Treaty
provisions on freedom of movement for persons, since the primary law of the
EU offers no guarantee to citizens that taking up residence or employment in
another Member State will be neutral in terms of social security.26 The
European (conflict) rules are neutral (they distribute social security
responsibilities and entitlements without regard to their substance), while
migration is not (it affects the migrant’s social security position through the
(change in) applicable national legislation). Many negative consequences of
migration are averted through the provisions of the coordinating Regulations
and, to a certain extent, a direct recourse to the free movement provisions of
the TFEU. The adverse effects which inexorably flow from the disparities
between social security schemes are, however, inherent in a system of mere
22. Case 110/79, Coonan, [1980] ECR 1445, para 12.
23. Case 1/78, Kenny, [1978] ECR 1489, para 16.
24. Case C-305/92, Hoorn, [1994] ECR I-1525, para 13.
25. See e.g. Pinna I, cited supra note 21, para 20; Case C-340/94, de Jaeck, [1997] ECR
I-461, para 18; Case C-221/95, Hervein I, [1997] ECR I-609, para 16; Hervein II, cited supra
note 21, paras. 50–52; Piatkowski, cited supra note 15, para 34; Case C-208/07, von
Chamier-Glisczinski, [2009] ECR I-6095, paras. 84–87; Case C-3/08, Leyman, [2009] ECR
I-9085, paras. 40 and 45; Case C-211/08, Commission v. Spain (hospital care during stay
abroad), [2010] ECR I-5267, para 61; Case C-345/09, Van Delft, [2010] ECR I-9879, paras.
99–101 and 106; Case C-388/09, da Silva Martins, judgment of 30 June 2011, nyr, paras.
71–72;Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 42–43; CaseC-562/10,Commission
v. Germany (long-term care benefits), judgment of 12 July 2012, nyr, paras. 57–58; Case
C-619/11, Dumont de Chassart, judgment of 21 Feb. 2013, nyr, para 40.
26. E.g. da Silva Martins, cited supra note 25, para 72; Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak, cited
supra note 1, para 43; Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits), cited supra note 25,
para 58.
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coordination. That is the case for the obstacle caused by the shift of
competence from a Member State with a relatively advantageous social
security system to a State with relatively disadvantageous social security
legislation.27 Since such impediments are an inevitable by-product of the
choice not to harmonize social security schemes, they should be tolerated.
Competence is a necessary,28 but not sufficient condition for entitlement. A
person might not satisfy all internal and (lawful) external requirements for
receiving social security benefits in the competent Member State.
1.2. The principle of inviolability of purely national rights
Amongst the substantive rules, one should hold our attention in particular
since it does, to a great extent, underlie the new system of social protection.
The principle of supremacy grants European law a position superior to
national law and gives it precedence over conflicting national law. However,
this begs the question as to what is a “conflict”. That is the domain of the
doctrine of pre-emption, which allows to determine the extent to which
national law is displaced by European law. Since “[t]he spectrum of conflict is
open-ended and ranges from purely hypothetical frictions to literal
contradictions between norms”,29 the legislating, executive and judicial
bodies of the European Union and its Member States, and, ultimately, the ECJ
must establish the extent to which national law conflicts with the Regulations
and the TFEU and is therefore displaced by them. While much of this
assessment is done on a case-by-case basis, one general guideline was issued
by the ECJ and subsequently endorsed by the European legislature: where
national law is more beneficial to a migrant when taken in isolation than when
applied together with the Regulation, it cannot be pre-empted.
Article 48 TFEU is the main legal basis for the European coordination of
social security. Its “principal objective” is, in the eyes of the ECJ, to contribute
to “[t]he establishment of as complete a freedom of movement for workers as
possible”.30 In the field of social security law, this translates as the protection
of the social security rights ofmigrant persons and their family members.This
27. See e.g. Hervein II, cited supra note 21, para 51; da Silva Martins, cited supra note 25,
para 72; Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits), cited supra note 25, para 58.
28. At least, prior to Bosmann, cited supra note 3.
29. Schütze, “Supremacy without pre-emption? The very slowly emergent doctrine of
Community pre-emption”, (2006) CML Rev., 1034.
30. Case 75/63, Hoekstra, [1964] ECR (English spec. ed.) 184. See e.g. Case 92/63,
Nonnenmacher, [1964] ECR (English spec. ed.) 288; Case C-215/99, Jauch, [2001] ECR
I-1901, para 20; Case C-287/05, Hendrix, [2007] ECR I-6909, para 52; da Silva Martins, cited
supra note 25, para 70 and case law cited; Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para
53; Partena, cited supra note 2, para 46; Dumont de Chassart, cited supra note 25, para 53.
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objective is primarily realized through the social security Regulations adopted
on the basis of Article 48 TFEU, which are premised on the idea that national
law grants inadequate protection to migrants.Therefore, “the said regulations,
regarded as a whole, are intended, in certain circumstances, to benefit the
migrant worker as compared with the situation which would result for him
from the exclusive application of national law”.31 This assumption does not
hold true in all cases. When national law, taken in isolation, offers a better
social security protection than if it were supplemented by the Regulation, a
paradox comes into being. If the Regulations were to pre-empt such
conflicting but mobility-friendly national legislation, they would upset their
principal purpose. Enforcing the letter of the Regulations would prejudice
their spirit. In its van der Veen judgment, the ECJ prioritized the spirit and
accordingly ruled that, in those circumstances, national law should prevail
over the Regulations.32 It explained that the reduction of purely national rights
by the Regulations would run counter to the aim ofArticles 48 to 51 EEC (now
Arts. 45 to 48TFEU).The European legislature’smandate to coordinate social
security laws is limited in that it does not empower it to diminish rights which
exist under national legislation only.The application of some provisions of the
Regulation “have no purpose in the case of a Statute in which the result sought
by Article 51 [now Art. 48 TFEU] is already attained by virtue of national
legislation alone”.33 Consequently, “Regulation No 1408/71 may not be
interpreted as prohibiting national legislation from granting social security
benefits broader than those provided for by the application of that
regulation”.34 Progressively, that finding reached the status of a general,
constitutional principle of European social security law: the principle of
inviolability of purely national rights. The Petroni judgment clarified that it is
not only based on primary law, but is also part of it. In that case, Article 46(3)
Regulation 1408/71 was struck down as ultra vires the EEC Treaty insofar as
it allowed reductions of rights acquired on the grounds of domestic law only.35
This prompted Advocate General Warner to baptize it the “Petroni
31. Case 1/67, Ciechelski, [1967] ECR (English spec. ed.) 188.
32. Case 100/63, van der Veen, [1964] ECR (English spec. ed.) 565.
33. Ciechelski, cited supra note 31, 189.
34. Case 21/87,Borowitz, [1988] ECR 3715, para 24. See also Case 69/79, Jordens-Vosters,
[1980] ECR 75, para 11.
35. Case 24/75, Petroni, [1975] ECR 1149. See also Case 112/76, Manzoni, [1977] ECR
1647.
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principle”.36 The principle steadily spread across all branches of social
security37 and formed the object of codification.38
1.3. Strict exclusivity
The principle of inviolability of purely national rights applies to the question
of entitlement. If the legislation of the competent Member State is more
generous than the Regulations, it reigns. However, it was long unclear whether
it equally applied to the question of competence. A most interesting dilemma
arises when a person satisfies all conditions for entitlement to benefits under
the legislation of aMember State other than the competent State. For instance,
are German residents entitled to residence-based benefits in Germany the
qualifying conditions of which they meet, while the Netherlands is the
competentMember State pursuant to the State-of-employment rule?Applying
the principle of exclusivity strictly and provided no exceptions to that
principle are relevant, they would be deprived thereof; Article 13(1)
Regulation 1408/71 then acts as the sole obstacle to entitlements. However,
their entitlements, being based on German law only, deserve protection under
the Petroni principle. Which principle should prevail in such conflict? The
ECJ’s position has changed every two decades.
In the mid–1960s, the ECJ understood the principle of exclusivity in a
rather flexible way. In the Nonnenmacher case, it held that Articles 48 to 51
EEC (now Arts. 45 to 48 TFEU) and the Regulations adopted in
implementation thereof “are not opposed to legislation by the Member States
designed to bring about additional protection by way of social security for the
benefit of migrant workers”.39 Therefore, the principle of exclusivity does not
prohibit the application of the legislation of the non-competentMember State,
“except to the extent that it requires that person to contribute to the financing
of a social security institution which is unable to provide him with additional
36. Opinion ofA.G.Warner in Case 733/79, Laterza, [1980] ECR 1932 and in Case 807/79,
Gravina, [1980] ECR 2224.
37. See e.g. Petroni, cited supra note 35 (old-age benefits); Case 50/75, Massonet, [1975]
ECR 1473 (survivors’ benefits); Manzoni, cited supra note 35 (invalidity benefits); Case
100/78,Rossi, [1979] ECR 831 (family benefits); da SilvaMartins, cited supra note 25, para 75
(long-term care benefits/atypical sickness benefits); Case C-193/03, Bosch, [2004] ECR
I-9911 (sickness benefits stricto sensu); Case 79/81, Baccini, [1982] ECR 1063
(unemployment benefits). For an account of the current effects of the principle, see Bokeloh,
“Das Petroni-Prinzip des Europäischen Gerichtshofes: Inhalt, Entstehungsgeschichte, heutige
Bedeutung”, (2012) Zeitschrift für europäisches Sozial- und Arbeitsrecht, 126–129.
38. E.g. Regulation 1248/92 amending Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 574/72, O.J.
1992, L 136/7.
39. Nonnenmacher, cited supra note 30, page 288.
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advantages in respect of the same risk and of the same period”.40 The
European conflict rules had exclusionary effect if and only if a contribution
duty was imposed upon the worker or his employer41 which was not
compensated by additional advantages. Otherwise, the non-competent
Member State was bound to apply its legislation and to honour the purely
national rights arising thereunder. Competence was not always a prerequisite
for entitlement. The Nonnenmacher doctrine was confirmed by the 1967 van
derVecht case and followed by a string of rather inconclusive decisions.42 The
two landmark cases were based on the predecessor of Regulation 1408/71,
Regulation 3/58, which did not contain an express exclusivity rule.43 In
Nonnenmacher, the ECJ based its reasoning upon the interpretative problem
caused by the absence of such a rule,44 thereby suggesting that it may have
decided otherwise if exclusivity was expressly provided for.When Regulation
3/58 was replaced by Regulation 1408/71, the European legislature
unanimously inserted an exclusivity rule in its Article 13(1), which in its
original version provided that “[a] worker to whom this Regulation applies
shall be subject to the legislation of a single Member State only. That
legislation shall be determined in accordancewith the provisions of thisTitle”.
The Ten Holder judgment confirmed that the legislature had succeeded in
its endeavour to root out theNonnenmacher and van derVecht case law. In that
case, the ECJ adapted to the new legislative reality. Mrs Ten Holder, resident
of the Netherlands, was last employed in Germany, and hence subject to
German legislation. When her German sickness benefits expired, she sought
to gain access to the Dutch benefits for incapacity for work, which were open
for all Dutch residents. As it had done before, the ECJ stressed that the aim of
the European conflict rules is to subject a person to the social security scheme
of only one Member State. The effect of the European conflict rules is “to
divest the legislature of each Member State of the power to determine
the ambit and the conditions for the application of its national legislation”.45
The ECJ officially rescinded theNonnenmacher doctrine when it clarified the
40. Ibid., pages 288–289.
41. van der Vecht, cited supra note 18, page 354.
42. While Case 73/72, Bentzinger, [1973] ECR 283 and Perenboom (cited supra note 11)
seemed to amend the Nonnenmacher jurisprudence, Case 27/75, Bonaffini, [1975] ECR 971,
Massonet (cited supra note 37) and Jordens-Vosters (cited supra note 34) rather supported it.All
lack the clarity to constitute a seminal case.
43. Règlement n° 3 concernant la sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants, O.J. 1958,
30/561.
44. Nonnenmacher, cited supra note 30, page 288.
45. Ten Holder, cited supra note 3, para 21; Luijten, cited supra note 7, para 14;
Adanez-Vega, cited supra note 13, para 18; van Delft, cited supra note 25, para 51. See also
Kuijpers, cited supra note 6, para 14; Case C-107/94, Asscher, [1996] ECR I-3089, para 61.
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relationship between the exclusivity and the Petroni principles. The
exclusivity rule
“is not at variance with the Court’s decisions (see, in particular, . . . Case
24/75 Petroni…) to the effect that the application of Regulation No 1408/71
cannot entail the loss of rights acquired exclusively under national legislation.
That principle applies not to the rules for determining the legislation
applicable but to the rules of Community law on the overlapping of benefits
provided for by different national legislative systems. It cannot therefore have
the effect, contrary to Article 13(1) of Regulation No 1408/71, of causing a
person to be insured over the same period under the legislation of more than
one Member State, regardless of the obligations to contribute or of any other
costs which may result therefrom for that person”.46
Thereby, any possibility of a conflict was averted. Indeed, while the
principle of exclusivity applies only to the determination of the applicable
legislation, the Petroni principle governs everything but the determination of
the applicable legislation; it applies only to the competent Member State. The
ECJ implemented the distinction between the competence question and the
entitlement question in order to rule out any competence which is not based on
Regulation 1408/71. The exclusivity principle does not tolerate exceptions
other than those explicitly provided for in the Regulation.47 The parallel
system of social protection called into being by the ECJ in the Nonnenmacher
case was put to rest in Ten Holder. Competence became a condition sine qua
non for social security rights and duties. Only the competent Member State
bears social security responsibilities; all other Member States are prevented
from levying contributions and from awarding benefits. As a corollary, the
locus of social security conflict-of-law rules is solely at the European level;
the uniformization of the conflict rules can be cast as an instance of maximum
harmonization which leaves no room for the application of national conflict
rules. The principle of inviolability of purely national rights can no longer be
invoked against Member States lacking competence. The Ten Holder case law
was repeatedly and unequivocally confirmed by the ECJ48 and has showed no
46. Ten Holder, cited supra note 3, para 22 and, with minor alterations, Luijten, cited supra
note 7, para 15. Later case law clarified that the ECJ did not actually confine the Petroni
principle to “the rules of Community law on the overlapping of benefits provided for by
different national legislative systems”. See note 37 supra.
47. E.g. Arts. 14 and 68 Regulation 883/2004.
48. E.g. Aldewereld, cited supra note 11; Commission v. France (CRDS), cited supra note
11; Commission v. France (CSG), cited supra note 11; Adanez-Vega, cited supra note 13,
para 18.
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signs of weakness until recently.49 In Vogler, a challenge to the validity of the
exclusivity principle on the grounds of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality was deemed unworthy of a judgment by the ECJ, who, due to
the absence of room for reasonable doubt, instead resorted to a decision by
reasoned order to dismiss it. The rule laid down in Article 13(1) Regulation
1408/71 is now enshrined in Article 11(1) Regulation 883/2004.50
This episode of coordination history forms the background to the recent
case law. It shows that the exclusivity principle and a new system of social
protection for migrants under the legislation of the non-competent Member
State are two sides of the same coin. Only the strictest principle of exclusivity
is able to avoid such parallel systems.While it seems that in its recent case law
the ECJ does not resort to old solutions by reviving the Nonnenmacher
doctrine, a definite answer is lacking and, in any case, the ECJ faces old
problems. Besides, this historical perspective sheds light on the raison d’être
ofArticle 13(1) Regulation 1408/71: the European legislature intended to rule
out the nascent plurality of applicable legislation.
2. The creation of a voluntary system of social protection for
migrants
In a series of cases, the most striking of which are discussed in the following
paragraphs, the ECJ shifted the paradigm: by narrowing the reach of the
principle of exclusivity, it opened the door for the creation of an additional
layer of social security rights for migrants under the legislation of Member
States lacking competence.
49. The ECJ introduced some plurality of applicable legislation in the field of family
benefits, which was reduced, but not revoked, after Ten Holder (e.g. Laterza, cited supra note
36; Gravina, cited supra note 36; Case C-59/95, Bastos Moriana, [1997] ECR I-1071). As
regards health care benefits in kind, Vanbraekel could be considered as imposing duties upon a
Member State which, while competent in abstracto, is not competent in concreto (Case
C-368/98, Vanbraekel, [2001] ECR I-5363). Finally, in Van der Duin (Case C-156/01, Van der
Duin, [2003] ECR I-7045, paras. 41–42), Vanbraekel (paras. 36–37) and Bosch (cited supra
note 37, para 21), the ECJ incidentally hinted at an idea which it would bring to fruition in
Bosmann (cited supra note 3). Besides, European law does not preclude Member States
from levying social charges on undertakings established in their territory with respect
to self-employed persons insured elsewhere whose work they market, insofar as the
self-employed persons are not affected by such contributions (Case C-68/99, Commission v.
Germany (artists and journalists), [2001] ECR I-1865). Without downplaying their
importance, it must be said that all these cases fall short of setting a standard which could
reverberate across the whole Regulations and fundamentally alter the legal position of the
non-competent State.
50. Its “great importance” is underlined in recital 18a in the preamble to Regulation
883/2004.
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2.1. Bosmann
Mrs Bosmann, a single mother, resided with her children in Germany.51 In her
capacity of resident, she enjoyed German child benefits. When she took up
employment in the Netherlands, she lost all entitlement to child benefits. The
Dutch legislation, which became applicable as the lex loci laboris, did not
provide for such benefits to be granted to children aged over 18. The German
child benefits were discontinued on the sole basis of the principle of
exclusivity: since the Netherlands is the competent Member State and none of
the exceptions to Article 13(1) apply to the facts of the case, German
legislation cannot apply. The referring court sought to ascertain whether
European law allows Germany to deny Mrs Bosmann a benefit to which she
was entitled on the basis of German law only, when no equivalent title arises in
the competent Member State.
The approach of Advocate General Mazák reflects and underpins the Ten
Holder orthodoxy.52 Article 13(2)(a) Regulation 1408/71 vested competence
in the Member State of employment, i.e. the Netherlands, despite the fact that
both Mrs Bosmann and her children53 resided in Germany. Since the more
specific conflict rules laid down inArticle 76 Regulation 1408/71 andArticle
10 Regulation 574/72, both of which may result in a transfer of competence to
the Member State of residence, were not applicable, her situation was
governed by Dutch social security legislation only. The Advocate General
used the distinction between the question of competence and the question of
entitlement to argue that such outcome accords with the Regulation and the
TFEU.The origin of the problem is not a matter of competence, but rather one
of entitlement: the Dutch legislation did not provide for benefits for adult
children. While a lack of competence is prohibited by the strong effect of the
conflict rules, Ten Holder demonstrates that a lack of entitlement under the
legislation of the competent Member State can be lawful. The Advocate
General relied on the case law stating that the choice for coordination rather
than harmonization entails that those restrictions to free movement which
merely flow from the disparities between social security systems of the
Member States do not impinge upon the freemovement rights enshrined in the
Treaty. This was the case, because the source of the disadvantage which Mrs
Bosmann experienced lay in the substantive differences between the German
and the Dutch child benefits regarding age limits. The allegation of
discrimination could not be substantiated for lack of differential treatment:
51. Bosmann, cited supra note 3; seeVan derMei and Essers,Annotation to Case C-352/06,
Bosmann, (2009) CML Rev., 959–972.
52. Opinion of A.G. Mazák in Bosmann, cited supra note 3.
53. Art. 73 Regulation 1408/71.
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since the assessment of discrimination takes placewithin the framework of the
competent Member State, Mrs Bosmann must be compared to all other
workers employed in the Netherlands, who are not entitled to Dutch child
benefits in respect of their adult children either. In sum, European law was of
no avail to Mrs Bosmann.
TheGrandChamber of the ECJ first showed commitment to the principle of
exclusivity and to the lex loci laboris rule. It then established that the specific
conflict of laws rules, which organize a limited duplication of family benefits,
were not applicable to the facts of the case. Hence, Mrs Bosmann’s situation
was governed by Dutch legislation. The ECJ reversed its prior case law, and
held that:
“It follows that Community law does not require the competent German
authorities to grant Mrs Bosmann the family benefit in question. However,
neither can the possibility of such a grant be excluded, because, as is clear
from the contents of the file submitted to the Court, it is apparent that, under
the German legislation, Mrs Bosmann may be entitled to child benefit solely
because of her residence in Germany, which is for the national court to
determine”.54
The ECJ clarified its motives by deriving from Article 48 TFEU the rule
that “migrant workers must not lose their right to social security benefits or
have the amount of those benefits reduced because they have exercised the
right to freedom of movement conferred on them by the Treaty”.55 It found
further support in the first recital in the preamble to Regulation 1408/71which
embeds coordination within the framework of free movement of workers and
postulates that it should “contribute towards the improvement of their standard
of living and conditions of employment”. Therefore, “the Member State of
residence cannot be deprived of the right to grant child benefit to those
resident within its territory”.56
The Bosmann judgment inaugurated a parallel system of social security
coordination. The traditional coordination system is accessed through the
European conflict rules. Unless provisions of the Regulation provide
otherwise, the legislation of only oneMember State applies at any given point
in time, to the extent that it complies with the rules of the Regulation and, to a
certain degree, the TFEU. In Bosmann, the ECJ unlocked the gate to another
system, which concerns each Member State under whose legislation, taken in
isolation, entitlement to social security benefits arises. The lack of
competence no longer always precludes entitlement. As is exemplified by the
54. Bosmann, cited supra note 3, paras. 27–28.
55. Ibid., para 29.
56. Ibid., para 31, emphasis added.
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Kohll line of case law,57 new regimes such as the one created in Bosmann have
two existential needs: consolidation and fine-tuning, i.e. the broadening
and/or narrowing of the reach of a doctrine formulated in a seminal judgment
in later case law.58 Member States can be somewhat reluctant and/or slow to
internalize new interpretations of European law with which they disagree, in
particular when they occasion additional welfare burdens. Since the issues
surrounding the Petroni principle were described as “perhaps the most
controversial aspect” of international social security law59 and generated
resistance amongst the Member States and the European institutions alike,
culminating in the German authorities’ idea to amend the EC Treaty,60 an
isolated judgment, even if pronounced in Grand Chamber, which applies that
principle to the non-competent Member State is unlikely to overcome this
relative inertia.61 Besides, the scope of the new regime requires demarcation.
Which Member States must open their social security systems, and which
States escape social security responsibility? Several elements of the Bosmann
case could limit its scope, and it is the task of both the ECJ and observers to sift
out the trivial factors. The Hendrix, von Chamier-Glisczinski, Hudzinski and
Wawrzyniak andCommission v.Germany (long-term care benefits) judgments
cater for those needs.
2.2. Von Chamier-Glisczinski and Commission v. Germany (long-term
care benefits)
The risk of reliance on care, whichwas ignored by the Europeanwelfare States
until relatively recently, does not figure amongst the risks covered by the
Regulation. The ECJ categorized long-term care benefits as “sickness
benefits” within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) Regulation 1408/71.62 The
Regulation distinguishes between sickness benefits in kind and in cash.63
57. Some 15 years after the publication of the seminal Kohll and Decker judgments,
preliminary questions are still asked, infringement proceedings are still launched and legislative
action is undertaken in order to determine their precise implications and to enforce them; Case
C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831; Directive
2011/24; see Obermaier, The End of Territoriality? The Impact of ECJ Rulings on British,
German and French Social Policy (Ashgate, 2009).
58. Obermaier, op. cit. supra note 57, p. 3, note 5.
59. Forde, “The vertical conflict of social security laws in the European Court”, (1980)
LIEI, 23.
60. Bokeloh, op. cit. supra note 37, 124 and 126 and Forde, op. cit. supra note 59, 57. The
principle is now widely accepted (Bokeloh, 129).
61. See also Golynker, “Coordination of social security schemes in the European Union:
The Rashomon effect in Bosmann”, (2009) Journal of Social Security Law, 73.
62. Case C-160/96, Molenaar, [1998] ECR I-843, paras. 21–25.
63. See von Chamier-Glisczinski, cited supra note 25, para 48 and the case law cited.
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Only the latter must be exported by the competent Member State to the
Member State of stay or residence. Under certain conditions, benefits in kind
are served by the institution of the place of residence or, as the casemay be, the
place of stay, in accordance with its own legislation and on behalf of the
competent institution, which bears the costs. The competence with respect to
care benefits in kind is thus spread over theMember State of stay or residence,
which should grant such benefits, and the competent Member State, which
remains in charge of all other aspects, including e.g. the collection of
contributions. The consequences for dependent persons of this coordination
on the basis of the rules on sickness benefits can be harsh when the Member
State of residence or stay offers less advantageous care benefits in kind in
terms of amount, duration or qualifying conditions or does not provide for
such benefits at all.
Despite moving from Germany to Austria, Mrs von Chamier-Glisczinski
remained subject to German legislation. As she did not qualify for Austrian
care benefits in kind, she asked the German authorities to bear the costs of her
stay in a specialized care home inAustria; the German institution rejected that
request on the ground that the full in-patient care benefit is a non-exportable
benefit in kind, and instead granted her a lower cash benefit.
The ECJ found that the provisions on sickness benefits designated Austria
as responsible for granting care benefits in kind in accordance with its own
legislation. Where Austria does not provide for such benefits, the Regulation
cannot be relied upon to compel Germany to award its benefits in kind outside
its boundaries.The ECJ went on to observe that the European conflict rules do
not prevent Germany from granting such benefits nonetheless.64 A German
provision however suspends the right to care benefits in kind during periods of
stay or residence abroad. In its answer to the second question, the ECJ
proceeded to test the validity thereof in the light of the freemovement rights of
citizens. It first emphasized the powers of the Member States in matters of
social security law and the wide discretion enjoyed by the authors of the
Regulation, whose regulatory choices regarding the provision of sickness
benefits in kind are legitimate. Admittedly, seen through the lens of Article
18(1) EC (nowArt. 21(1) TFEU), the non-export places persons such as Mrs
von Chamier-Glisczinski in a situation less favourable than if she stayed in a
care home in Germany.The ECJ nevertheless considered it to comply with the
right to free movement underArticle 18(1) EC. Her unfortunate legal position
was merely the outcome of the application of lawful provisions of the
Regulation, which provides for the coordination and not the harmonization of
the social security legislation of the Member States. Article 42 EC (nowArt.
48TFEU) tolerates both the disparities between the social security systems of
64. Ibid., paras. 55–56.
CML Rev. 20131236 Rennuy
theMember States and the disadvantages which can result therefrom.The lack
of entitlement suffered by Mrs von Chamier-Glisczinski flowed rather from
the disparities betweenGerman andAustrian legislation on the risk of reliance
on care than from the German residence condition alone. Given the powers of
Germany and Austria in shaping their sickness insurance schemes,
“one of those schemes cannot be considered to be the cause of a
discrimination or a disadvantage for the sole reason that it has unfavourable
consequences when it is applied, in accordance with the coordination
mechanisms laid down in application of Article 42 EC [now Article 48
TFEU], in combination with the scheme of another Member State”.65
This is wholly in line with the Bosmann judgment. By respecting the
German residency condition, the ECJ confirmed the optional nature of the
new regime of social security coordination: the limitation of Bosmann to
purely national rights does not as such contravene Article 21(1) TFEU.
Besides, the ECJ clarified that theBosmannmechanism also covers long-term
care benefits. Von Chamier-Glisczinski also extends Bosmann in two
directions.Where the defendant institution inBosmann belonged to aMember
State lacking all competence, Germany was in principle competent for Mrs
vonChamier-Glisczinski’s social security position, were it not that a provision
of the Regulation carved out an exception to that competence in respect of care
benefits in kind; Bosmann can affect the competent Member State inasmuch
as a provision of the Regulation delegates part of its competence to another
State. Provided the Bosmann conditions are fulfilled, a person residing or
staying outside the competent Member State could thus apply for sickness
benefits in cash in his or her Member State of residence or stay. The ECJ also
made clear that the Bosmann mechanism can apply to Member States other
than the State of residence.
In Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits), the Commission
attempted to bring long-term care benefits within the scope of theKohll line of
case law.66 In particular, it alleged that the German refusal to export certain
non-hospital care benefits in kind beyond the situations envisaged in the
Regulations contravened the freedom to provide services. As Germany was
not competent in that particular respect and its legislation contained a
residence condition, the Commission effectively requested the ECJ to waive
the German opt-out. The ECJ concluded that the Commission had failed to
substantiate its claims. It based that finding on the particular nature of care
benefits as opposed to typical sickness benefits, the burden of proof resting on
the Commission in infringement procedures, the validity and effect of the
65. Ibid., para 87.
66. Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits), cited supra note 25.
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relevant provisions of the Regulation and the neutrality of EU social security
law. The ruling confirms and generalizes von Chamier-Glisczinski.
2.3. Hendrix
In Hendrix, the existence of a purely national right depended entirely on the
exercise of discretionary powers by the institutions of a Member State that
used to be competent.67 Mr Hendrix was entitled to a Dutch benefit for young
disabled persons suffering from long-term incapacity for work; when he
moved to Belgium, the Dutch authorities terminated the payment of the
benefit. The coordination of special non-contributory cash benefits
(hereinafter “SNCBs”) is based on two intertwined rules: theMember State of
residence is solely competent (the competence rule) and SNCBs are served
only in that Member State (the non-export rule).68 The ECJ focused on the
latter rule and proceeded to examine the compliance of the Dutch non-export
rule with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of workers. A provision
of Dutch law vested discretionary powers in the administration to waive the
residence requirement when ending the benefit would entail an “unacceptable
degree of unfairness”. The ECJ instructed the national court to interpret this
hardship provision in accordance with the requirements of European law and
the principle of proportionality, and in particular to take account of the
circumstance thatMrHendrix had exercised his right of freedom ofmovement
as a worker and had kept all his economic and social links to the Netherlands.
Seen in the light of the competence rule, Hendrix tells us something
significant about Bosmann. By taking up residence in Belgium, Mr Hendrix
triggered a change in the applicable legislation.69 The Netherlands could have
turned down the claim on the ground that only Belgium was competent with
regard to SNCBs. The underlying question was thus whether Mr Hendrix
could gain access to the benefits of a Member State lacking competence.
Whether he was protected by the Bosmann mechanism – which had yet to be
articulated –70 was contingent upon the hardship clause: only if the residence
condition was waived would he enjoy purely national rights despite his move
abroad. By strongly hinting that the national court should waive it, the ECJ
established a duty to interpret discretionary powers in such a way as to create
entitlement to purely national rights under the legislation of the
67. Hendrix, cited supra note 30.
68. Art. 10a Regulation 1408/71; Art. 70 Regulation 883/2004.
69. The ECJ assumed that Mr Hendrix resided in Belgium within the meaning of Art. 1(h)
Reg. 1408/71.
70. The seeds were planted in Van der Duin, cited supra note 49, para 41.
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non-competent Member State, at least in circumstances where the claimant
can demonstrate the existence of a strong link with that State.
2.4. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak
Mr Hudzinski worked as a self-employed farmer in Poland, where he and his
children resided. Availing himself of the possibility for the posting of
self-employed persons opened by Article 14a(1)(a) Regulation 1408/71, he
performed employed work as a seasonal worker in a German horticultural
business during three and a half months. He claimed German child benefits
for that period, during which neither he nor his wife seem to have received
Polish family benefits. MrWawrzyniak was in a similar situation. He resided
in Poland with his wife and their daughter. His employer posted him to
Germany from February to December 2006 under Article 14(1)(a). While his
wife was in receipt of Polish child benefits amounting to approximately ¤12
per month, he applied for the payment of German child benefits of ¤154 a
month. Since it was uncontested that Poland, and not Germany, was the
competentMember State, both applicants in themain proceedings relied upon
the Bosmann ruling to sustain their claims. German legislation granted child
benefits not only to German residents, as was the case in Bosmann, but also to
persons subject to unlimited income tax liability under German law or treated
as such, which both claimants in the main proceedings were. The referring
court discerned four differences between the pending case and the Bosmann
judgment and hence entertained serious doubts as to whether that judgment
could be applied to the facts of the case.
The ECJ, sitting in Grand Chamber, first demonstrated allegiance to the
very cornerstones of social security law, from which it would later depart to a
certain extent. After describing the exclusivity principle as part of “settled
case law”,71 it held that Article 48 TFEU does not affect substantive and
procedural differences between the social security systems of the Member
States, emphasizing the powers of the Member States in that regard.72
Accordingly,
“the primary law of the European Union cannot guarantee to an insured
person that moving to another Member State will be neutral in terms of social
security.Thus, the application, possibly under the provisions of RegulationNo
1408/71, following a change of Member State of residence, of national
legislation that is less favourable as regards social security benefits may in
71. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 41.
72. Ibid., para 42.
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principle be compatible with the requirements of primary EU law on freedom
of movement for persons”.73
This shields the European conflict rules from a direct challenge. Thus, only
the Polish legislation is applicable pursuant to Regulation 1408/71, even if the
Polish benefits are less favourable than their German counterparts.74
The ECJ then extensively cited the Bosmann case, and ascertained whether
it could be applied to the facts of the case. The ECJ consolidated the Bosmann
case, largely in the fashion suggested by the Advocate General. The first
question was probably caused by a statement in Bosmann to the effect that the
loss of benefits, the origins of which remain unspecified, due to the exercise of
the right to freedom ofmovement, is prohibited. InHudzinski andWawrzyniak
the ECJ made clear that the fact that migration was not prejudicial to the
appellants in the main proceedings75 does not prevent the Bosmann rule from
applying. A fortiori, a complete loss of benefits is not required.76 Thereby the
ECJ also accepted that Bosmann might be called into play even when an
entitlement to comparable benefits is retained in the competent Member
State,77 which raises the prospect of an overlapping of benefits. Previously,
one could have argued thatBosmann only vests competence in a State when no
corresponding benefits are received in the competent Member State, resulting
in a single, but different applicable legislation for a particular benefit.
The second point of contention in the Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak cases
concerned the connecting factor. In Bosmann, Germany was held liable
because child benefits were open to all parents resident in Germany. Asked
whether this was a sine qua non condition for the Bosmann rule, the ECJ
acknowledged that the residence of the parents and children are “specific and
particularly close connecting factors”.78 However, the fact of subjection to
unlimited income tax liability, which constitutes the basis for entitlement in
theHudzinski andWawrzyniak cases, is “based on a precise criterion and may
73. Ibid., para 43.
74. Ibid., para 44.
75. The Hudzinski family does not seem to have been in receipt of any child benefits before
or during the period of posting. MrWawrzyniak’s wife received child benefits, which remained
constant before and during that period.
76. See Golynker, op. cit. supra note 61, 69–70.
77. The ECJ had previously generated some confusion by applying Bosmann under the
condition that “the legislation of the [Member State of residence, which is competent in that
respect] does not provide for the grant of benefits in kind covering the risk in respect of which
entitlement to such benefits is claimed” (von Chamier-Glisczinski, cited supra note 25, para 55.
See also Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in that case, paras. 51 and 55; Lhernould and Martin,
“Versement transfrontalier de prestations de dépendance: L’ ‘axiome Bosmann’ revisité:
Annotation to Case C-208/07, von Chamier-Glisczinski”, (2009) Revue de Jurisprudence
sociale, 791–792; van der Mei and Essers, op. cit. supra note 51, 966).
78. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 65.
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be regarded as being sufficiently close, when account is also taken of the fact
that the family benefit claimed is financed by tax revenue”.79 The ECJ
effectively broadens Bosmann to all situations in which a family benefit is
awarded under national law only, irrespective of the domestic connecting
factor;80 the ECJ’s reference to precision and closeness draws very remote
limits. The fact that the ECJ allotted competence to the Member State of
residence in the Bosmann judgment leads to the question whether it could be
read as an indicator of a more general shift from the lex loci laboris to the lex
loci domicilii.81 It was plain already in Bosmann that this flowed merely from
the German reliance upon residence as a connecting factor, rather than an
underlying policy agenda of the ECJ to do away with the lex loci laboris, and
the von Chamier-Glisczinski and Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak cases have the
merit of clarifying this. In practice, however, the new regime will more often
than not concern the Member State of residence.82
This broadening of Bosmann did not suffice to grant the benefits to Mr
Wawrzyniak. The answer to the last two questions of the Wawrzyniak case is
set out below.
2.5. The rationale and scope of the Bosmann mechanism
Bosmannwas ostensibly based on the idea thatArticle 42 EC (now 48TFEU)
entails that “migrant workers must not lose their right to social security
benefits or have the amount of those benefits reduced because they have
exercised the right to freedom of movement conferred on them by the
Treaty”.83 Without specification that the benefits in question were rooted in
national law only, which in casu they were, the statement can at best be
considered as an illegitimate child of the Petroni principle and yields doubts
79. Ibid., para 66.
80. See also Van der Duin, cited supra note 49; Hendrix, cited supra note 30; von
Chamier-Glisczinski, cited supra note 25.
81. See Babayev, “Exploring the fate of the lex loci laboris rule and its exclusive effect
under Regulation 883/2004: Annotation to Case C-352/06, Bosmann”, (2011) European
Journal of Social Law, 84–85 and 88; Golynker, op. cit. supra note 61, 70–73.
82. That is not due to a theoretical link with that Member State, but merely results from the
combined effect of the prevalence of the lex loci laboris under the Regulation and the relative
popularity of the lex loci domicilii amongst Member States. Since most persons with
connections to more than one State are insured in their Member State of employment, the
non-competent Member State most likely to provide them benefits under the new regime is that
in which they reside.
83. Bosmann, cited supra note 3, para 29.
Social security 1241
about its implications.84 Mrs von Chamier-Glisczinski lost her entitlement to
care benefits in kind for the sole reason of exercising her right of free
movement as an economically inactive citizen. The ECJ’s refusal to uphold
her claim is in line with the Petroni principle – since she enjoyed no rights
under German law alone – but not with the stated rationale ofBosmann quoted
above. The Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak cases have the merit of lifting any
remaining doubt by grounding the new regime in the Petroni principle.85 The
ECJ explained that the statement in Bosmann is merely exemplary. It is only
one expression of the idea that the coordinating Regulations should be
interpreted in the light of the objective of Article 48 TFEU, which is “to
contribute to the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement
for migrant workers”;86 as stated by its first recital, Regulation 1408/71 aims
to improve the standard of living and conditions of employment of migrant
workers. Consequently, the rationale for the choice of the non-competent
Member State lies not in the prevention of loss of entitlements due to
migration, but in the protection of rights “granted solely by virtue of the
legislation of a single Member State”.87 This passage firmly anchors the new
regime of social protection to the principle of inviolability of purely national
rights. Confronted with the perennial dilemma whether or not to pre-empt
more favourable national legislation of a Member State lacking competence,
the ECJ again changed its mind: the Petroni principle does take precedence
over the exclusivity principle.88 The holding in Ten Holder and Luijten to the
effect that the Petroni principle does not apply to the European conflict rules
and thus shields only purely national rights under the legislation of the
competent Member State is largely revoked. In Bosmann, the ECJ offered a
distinction from Ten Holder and Luijten which virtually all commentators
found unconvincing.89 Ten Holder, the ECJ held, concerned a refusal by the
authorities of the competentMember State to award a benefit.The truth is that,
in both cases, the defending institution belonged to aMember State other than
the competent State. While Mrs Ten Holder failed to meet the conditions for
84. Lhernould, Annotation to Case C-352/06, Bosmann, (2008) Revue de droit sanitaire et
social, 988; Kessler, “Prestations familiales: Une nouvelle remise en cause du principe
d’unicité de la législation applicable: Annotation to Case C-352/06, Bosmann”, (2008) Revue
de Jurisprudence sociale, 772.
85. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, paras. 51–57.
86. Ibid., para 53.
87. Ibid., para 56.
88. See also Devetzi, “Von ‘Bosmann’ zu ‘Hudzinski’ und ‘Wawrzyniak’: Deutsches
Kindergeld in Europa”, (2012) Zeitschrift für europäisches Sozial- und Arbeitsrecht, 447.
89. Babayev, op. cit. supra note 81, 79–81; Bokeloh, op. cit. supra note 37, 126; Cousins,
“Overview of recent cases before the European Court of HumanRights and the European Court
of Justice (March – May 2008)”, (2008) European journal of Social Security (EJSS), 167; Van
derMei and Essers, op. cit. supra note 51, 694. See also Golynker, op. cit. supra note 61, 68–69.
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entitlement under national law, Mrs van Vermoolen, née Luijten, did hold a
purely national right which would have been worthy of protection under
Bosmann. As will be explained below, Ten Holder may keep its whole
significance with regard to the ability of the State lacking competence to levy
contributions. The Petroni principle and the doctrine of pre-emption give a
solid constitutional basis to the new regime of coordination, allowing the
otherwise valid arguments of Advocate General Mazák to be outweighed.
Since the Petroni principle is part of primary law, it is an adequate basis for
interpreting a provision of secondary law against its letter and spirit and
thereby carving an exception to the prevailing neutrality of EU social security
law.90 The Petroni principle mitigates neutrality by setting a floor of
protection; by extending that principle to the competence question, the ECJ
makes proper use of the Treaty and national law to ease some detrimental
effects of neutrality. Moreover, while it is true that the disadvantage Mrs
Bosmann incurred flowed merely from the disparities between the German
andDutch legislation, the ECJ inHudzinski andWawrzyniak clarified that that
disadvantage is strange to its reasoning.
This rationale allows one to draw a couple of conclusions. The Bosmann
procedure can be described as follows. Member States lacking competence
must henceforth apply their social security legislation in full to any uninsured
person who requests it. Unlike their competent counterpart, they apply only
their domestic legislation, leaving aside any provision of primary or secondary
EU legislation, including the principle of exclusivity enshrined in Article
13(1) Regulation 1408/71 and Article 11(1) Regulation 883/2004. If an
entitlement to social security benefits accrues from national law only, and that
is a matter for the national court to decide,91 then Bosmann requires that
benefit to be paid. Otherwise, the non-competent State escapes social security
duties.
The case law to date concerns family benefits, care benefits in kind and
SNCBs. In van der Duin, the ECJ suggested it also applies to classic sickness
benefits in kind.92 Bosmann is at the intersection of the principle of
inviolability of purely national rights and the exclusivity principle, both of
which apply across the board of the Regulation. Therefore, the Bosmann
regime in principle covers all social security benefits within the meaning of
90. See also Eichenhofer, Annotation to Case C-352/06, Bosmann, (2008) Zeitschrift für
europäisches Sozial- undArbeitsrecht, 460. Contra: Opinion ofA.G. Mazák in Bosmann, cited
supra note 3, paras. 67–82; Babayev, op. cit. supra note 81, 81–82; Kessler, op. cit. supra note
84, 772.
91. Bosmann, cited supra note 3, paras. 28, 36 and 37.
92. Van derDuin, cited supra note 49, para 41, which indicates that the Jordens-Vosters case
(cited supra note 34) was not overruled by TenHolder (cited supra note 3). See alsoVanbraekel,
cited supra note 49, paras. 36–37 and Bosch, cited supra note 37, para 21.
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those regulations.93 That is not to say that it cannot be modulated according to
the particularities of certain benefits and situations, and in particular the
method of funding. Since the Petroni principle tolerates “express exception[s]
consistent with the aims of theTreaty,”94 the European legislature has a limited
licence to derogate from it. The ECJ will have to clarify whether such
exceptions exist and whether Bosmann overrules cases in which it previously
ruled out the application of the legislation of the non-competent Member
State.95
The practical impact of the Bosmann mechanism should not be
underestimated. The slightest divergence between the conflict rules of the
Regulation on the one hand, and, on the other, those of a Member State other
than the State which is competent according to the Regulation opens the
prospect of a Bosmann-type competence. The number of combinatorial
possibilities is huge. Take a worker who is posted from Member State A to
Member State B. The legislation of State A will apply according to Article
12(1) Regulation 883/2004. In State B, he may well meet the domestic
definition of an “employed person” and thereby become entitled to those
benefits which are open only to economically active persons. If he stays in host
State B for the duration of the posting, he might be considered a resident,
which would give him access to residence-based benefits. Supposing the
worker is habitually resident in a third Member State C, he would probably
gain access to that State’s residence-based benefits. In the field of family
benefits, this exercise should be iterated for both parents or guardians.
Moreover, as the German legislation at issue in Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak
illustrates, States use criteria other than residence or economic activity to
delineate their social security benefits. Divergences between national and
European conflict rules are widespread, and hence a substantial number of
migrants should be able to clear the first hurdle to gain access to benefits by
93. Babayev, “Equal treatment on the grounds of movement and Union choice-of-law rules
underArticle 81TFEU”, (2012)MJ, 74; Jorens, et al., “Towards a new framework for applicable
legislation: New forms of mobility, coordination principles and rules of conflict”, (2008) trESS
Think Tank Report, available at: <www.tress-network.org/tress2012/EUROPEAN%20RE
SOURCES/EUROPEANREPORT/ThinkTank_Mobility.pdf> [last visited 13 Feb. 2013],
26–27 and 34; Jorens, “Towards new rules for the determination of the applicable legislation?”
in Jorens (Ed.), 50 years of Social Security Coordination: Past – Present – Future (Publications
Office of the European Union, 2010), p. 185; Van der Mei and Essers, op. cit. supra note 51,
966.
94. Rossi, cited supra note 37, para 14; Laterza, cited supra note 36, para 8; Gravina, cited
supra note 36, para 7; Case 320/82, D’Amario, [1983] ECR 3811, para 4; Case C-16/09,
Schwemmer, [2010] ECR I-9717, para 58; da Silva Martins, cited supra note 25, para 75;
Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 56.
95. E.g. Ten Holder, cited supra note 3; Miethe, cited supra note 20; Luijten, cited supra
note 7.
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demonstrating some connection to one or more non-competent Member
States, at least with regard to certain branches of social security.
The determination of the international field of application of national social
security schemes is a core task of international social security law at national,
European and international level. By depriving the European legislature of
some powers in that regard, the ECJ devolves them to theMember States, who
recover the power to open up their social security systems to uninsured
persons – an ability which they had relinquished by (unanimously) enacting
Article 13(1) Regulation 1408/71.Bosmann clarifies that amere invocation of
Article 13(1) Regulation 1408/71 by the executive and judiciary bodies of the
Member States is inadequate.96This inadequacy, again, flows from thePetroni
principle: since Article 13(1) cannot corrode purely national rights, reliance
upon it is futile. The diminished effectiveness of the Regulation can be, but is
not necessarily, absorbed by the Member States, who now face a choice.
Member States might feel responsible for persons who, despite being
compulsorily insured in anotherMember State, are still considered by them as
part of their solidaristic community. The most obvious groups are pensioners
who spent a substantial part of their career in a State before emigrating, and
frontier workers. EU social security law can have very severe effects on the
rights of individuals. Some well-known problems, both pan-European and
country-specific, cannot realistically be solved at the European level in the
short term. Member States might thus consider addressing some drawbacks
through their national legislation, by granting compensating benefits to
uninsured persons. A.P. van der Mei and G. Essers give the example of the
Belgian “internal” frontier worker pension, which tops the foreign pension of
persons residing in Belgium up to the level of a fictional Belgian pension
representing the amount which the pensioners would have built up if they had
only worked in Belgium.97 While such action furthers the free movement of
persons, it formally breached European law.98 Even if the likelihood of
judicial procedures was low, this constituted a disincentive for such largesse
on the part of concerned national legislators.99 By incentivizing it, Bosmann
contributes to addressing outstanding social needs.
96. Contra: Hermans, “Woonland mag kinderbijslag toekennen, ook al is ander land
aangewezen als de bevoegde staat: Annotation to Case C-352/06, Bosmann”, (2008)
Nederlands tijdschrift voor sociaal recht, 226–227.
97. Van der Mei and Essers, op. cit. supra note 51, 966.
98. Voluntary insurance could solve only a limited number of these problems, given the
constraints of Art. 15 Regulation 1408/71 and Art. 14 Regulation 883/2004.
99. The extent to which Member States voluntarily granted benefits to uninsured persons
prior to Bosmann is unknown (Coucheir et al., “The relationship and interaction between the
coordination Regulations and Directive 2004/38/EC”, (2008) trESS Think Tank Report,
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In other situations, Member States may want to avoid being held liable to
grant benefits. They can erect a defensive wall by tailoring their national
legislation so as to exclude persons for whom they are not competent
according to the Regulation, and those persons alone. The example of child
benefits might be instructive, since the basic internal qualifying conditions
(i.e. those which are unrelated to the international field of application) are the
existence of a familial link between the child and the entitled person and the
age of the child. Measures such as lowering the age limit for child benefits
would be successful in excluding Mrs Bosmann, but would come at the price
of over-inclusiveness, also affecting many persons compulsorily insured in
Germany, and under-inclusiveness, since many uninsured parents of young
children might still be able to assert purely national rights. These Member
States should therefore focus on the rules delineating the international field of
application of their legislation, i.e. their external conditions. As regards the
question of competence, a State can reject competence when another Member
State is competent pursuant to the Regulation through a national exclusivity
rule.100 Such a rule could read “benefit shall be granted to all persons resident
in Germany or liable to income tax there, except those to whom, on the basis
of the rules governing the law applicable under Regulation 1408/71, the social
security law of another Member State of the European Union or of another
State party to the European Economic Area applies as of right”.101 As Von
Chamier-Glisczinski and Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits)
illustrate, the same effect can be obtained by replicating the European rules in
the national legislation.102 As to the question of entitlement, a State can rule
out entitlement to its benefits when similar foreign benefits are received
according to the Regulation by enacting or maintaining a national rule against
the overlapping of benefits. Subparagraph (1) of paragraph 65 of the
Einkommensteuergesetz (German federal law on income tax hereafter
available at: <www.tress-network.org/tress2012/EUROPEAN%20RESOURCES/EUROPE
ANREPORT/ThinkTank_Residence.pdf> [last visited 19 March 2013], 8).
100. The strong effect of the determination of the applicable legislation prohibits the
competentMember State from enforcing a national exclusivity rule (Kuijpers, cited supra note
6). National anti-overlapping rules can be applied by the competentMember State only in so far
as that is allowed by the Regulation.
101. The confidence of Hermans (op. cit. supra note 96, 227) about the respect of the ECJ
for such rules is not wholly shared by other commentators (Jorens et al., op. cit. supra note 93,
26; Jorens andVan Overmeiren, “General principles of coordination in Regulation 883/2004”,
(2009) EJSS, 75; Jorens, op. cit. supra note 93, 184–185. See also Van der Mei and Essers, op.
cit. supra note 51, 966–969).
102. Insofar as the national conflict rules of a Member State are identical to the European
conflict rules, they rule out the existence of purely domestic entitlements when that State lacks
competence.
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“EStG”), at issue in the second part of Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak and
examined below, belongs to that category.
The delivery of Bosmann in spring 2008 thus opened a period of transition.
EachMember State should decide whether and to what extent it wants to open
its social security schemes to persons who are insured in another Member
State and undertake the necessary steps to translate its wish into law.
Bosmann does generate overlapping of benefits. Since it leaves Member
States with an escape route and does not compel persons to pay social security
contributions to aMember Statewhich lacks competence, it does not engender
the complications which the exclusivity principle aims to avoid.103
The interaction between the traditional and new coordination systems is
very limited, since by definition they concern different Member States; in that
sense they are truly parallel. The traditional system is compulsory, while the
reach of the new system inaugurated in Bosmann is coterminous with the
goodwill – or lack of foresight – of the Member States.
3. From possibility to duty?
Given the doctrine of pre-emptionwhich underliesBosmann andPetroni, both
judgments protect only purely national rights. Any interference of European
law in the social security affairs of the non-competent Member State would
not only lift this boundary, but moreover curb the freedom of choice of the
non-competent Member State. Those Member States who do not wish to
partake in the new system should demonstrate that no purely national
entitlement to social security benefits arises under its legislation; the rules
preventing entitlement are beyond review by the ECJ. Not only did the ECJ
emphasize this limit repeatedly,104 it moreover resisted attempts to turn this
option into an obligation in the Van der Duin,105 von Chamier-Glisczinski and
Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits) cases. Recently, however,
the ECJ yielded to the demands of a claimant: a rule on the international field
of application of the social security system of a State lacking competence was
lifted for it contravened the principle of proportionality, as understood in the
case law on Union citizenship.
The answer to the first questions of the Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak cases
is set out above. While the Bosmann mechanism sufficed to satisfy Mr
103. Coucheir, et al., op. cit. supra note 99, 8;Van derMei and Essers, op. cit. supra note 51,
965.
104. Bosmann, cited supra note 3, paras. 27, 28, 31–33, 36–37;Hudzinski andWawrzyniak,
cited supra note 1, paras. 45, 48–51, 55–57, 62, 68 and 70. See also C-62/11, Land Hessen v.
Feyerbacher, judgment of 19 July 2012, nyr, paras. 45–46.
105. Van der Duin, cited supra note 49, paras. 41–42.
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Hudzinski’s claim, MrWawrzyniak saw his claims denied on the grounds of a
German rule. Subparagraph (1) of paragraph 65 of the EStG, headed “Other
child benefits”, is a national anti-overlapping rule which reads “Child
allowance shall not be paid for a child who is in receipt of . . . child benefits
granted outside Germany and comparable to child allowance”.106 Mr
Wawrzyniak’s wife was in receipt of Polish child benefits. The third and
fourth questions referred by the national court in the Wawrzyniak case
concerned the compatibility of that provision with European Union law and
the ensuing overlap of benefits. In essence, the question was whether a
Member State is completely free to refuse benefits to persons insured in
another Member State.
As in von Chamier-Glisczinski and Commission v. Germany (long-term
care benefits), one would have expected the ECJ to reject the claim, even if the
social security legislation of the non-competent Member State in principle
falls within the scope of the free movement provisions of theTFEU.Advocate
General Mazák put forward several arguments in favour of an uncurbed
Bosmann choice.107 Not Germany, but Poland is the competent Member State
under the conflict rules of the Regulation governing posting.There are neither
indications nor allegations that those rules might breach EU law. The posting
regime for workers serves the freedom to provide services and the free
movement of workers, while avoiding administrative complications.Bosmann
merely opened the option to grant child benefits, without imposing an
obligation to do so.TheAdvocateGeneral then invoked the sovereign power of
Member States to organize their social security schemes. Finally, he defused
the arguments, based on Schwemmer, put forward by the applicants in themain
proceedings. The Advocate General accordingly concluded that the German
anti-overlapping rule does not infringe European law, and can be enforced in
casu. This conclusion was further supported by the Commission, the
Hungarian Government, the German Government and the Bundesfinanzhof.
The ECJ underlined that, since a Member State other than the State
competent under the Regulation has “the power, but not the obligation, to
grant child benefits in accordance with its national law to a posted worker who
works temporarily within its territory, that State must in principle also be able
to decide, as the referring court stated, whether and, if appropriate, how it
intends to take account of the fact that there exists in the State which is
competent under that provision, in this case the Republic of Poland,
entitlement to a comparable benefit”.108 It then strayed from the Advocate
106. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 12.
107. Opinion of A.G. Mazák in Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, paras.
79–91.
108. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 70.
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General’s faithful account of Bosmann by testing the legality of the German
provision cited above in the light of EU law. The anti-overlapping rules of
secondary law, Article 10 Regulation 574/72 and Article 76 Regulation
1408/71, do not envisage a situation in which the Member State of
employment coincides with the Member State of residence of the children.
Considering paragraph 65 of the EStG in the light of theTFEU, the ECJ stated
that its application entails a substantial disadvantage affecting mainly migrant
workers to the extent that it prevents entitlement to benefits rather than
reducing their amount by that of a comparable benefit payable by another
State. The ECJ concluded that the German rule constitutes a breach of the free
movement of workers, relying upon two considerations: Mr Wawrzyniak
contributed to the funding of the child benefit through his income tax, which
is the relevant connecting factor used in German legislation. The payment of
the child benefit would not generate any disagreement with the freedom to
provide services, since it would not entail any costs or administrative
complications for Mr Wawrzyniak’s employer.
It is submitted that the Wawrzyniak judgment opens a second gate to the
social security system of the non-competent Member State, which transcends
the particular circumstances of that case. It is operationalized through a test
akin to that developed in Baumbast.109 Under the long-standing conception of
the hierarchy of norms in the internal market, national measures in the
pre-emptive field of application of secondary legislation are subject to the
principle of proportionality only when they derogate from harmonized norms
or when taken in the exercise of discretionary powers.110 There is a chain of
tests of compliance. The compatibility of the rule of secondary legislation
with the Treaty is tested in a highly abstract fashion: the judicial review of the
exercise of the wide discretionary powers under the social security
Regulations is confined to examining whether it is vitiated by manifest error
or misuse of powers, or whether the institution concerned has manifestly
exceeded the limits of its discretion.111 Next, the compliance of national
legislation with the valid rule of secondary legislation is scrutinized. If that
hurdle is cleared, the provisions of national law are shielded from the in
concreto proportionality assessment which they would otherwise have to
undergo. Under that understanding of the conflict of norms, even if the
non-competent Member State must apply its legislation, it is in no way
prevented from relying on disentitling provisions in order to foreclose any
109. Case C-413/99, Baumbast, [2002] ECR I-7091.
110. Dougan, “The constitutional dimension to the case law on Union citizenship”, (2006)
EL Rev., 619.
111. Vogler, cited supra note 21, para 24.
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claims under Bosmann: these provisions reflect the principle of exclusivity
and other conflict rules of the Regulation, which themselves are valid.
InBaumbast,112 the ECJ was asked whether an EU citizen who lost his right
to reside as a migrant worker in the host Member State can, in his capacity as
EU citizen, enjoy a right of residence there by direct application of Article
18(1) EC (now 21(1)TFEU), despite the fact that he did not fulfil
the requirements of sickness insurance laid down in Directive 90/364. Article
21(1) TFEU grants every European citizen the directly effective right to move
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, “subject to the
limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures
adopted to give it effect”. The ECJ considered the unsatisfied requirement of
Directive 90/364 to be part of those limitations and conditions, which “must
be applied in compliance with the limits imposed by Community law and in
accordancewith the general principles of that law, in particular the principle of
proportionality”.113 The correct national application of valid norms of
secondary law can thus be subjected to an in concreto proportionality
assessment, albeit with a lighter intensity of review. In De Cuyper, Hendrix
and Petersen, the ECJ applied this Baumbast test to the restrictions on the
possibility to export unemployment benefits and SNCBs laid down in
Regulation 1408/71.114
Straying from the path of the orthodox hierarchy of norms and treading in
the footsteps of Baumbast, the ECJ subjected a disentitling provision of the
non-competent State to a direct test under the free movement provisions of the
TFEU in Wawrzyniak. This new form of indirect legal review allows a
distinction to be drawn betweenMember States which are faced with a duty to
grant benefits despite their own legislation and those which are still able to opt
out of the system. The following is an attempt to assimilate the lessons of
Wawrzyniak and other social security cases in order to outline the new test and
identify some relevant variables. Three issues in particular should be settled:
the standard of review, its intensity and its outcome.115
112. Baumbast, cited supra note 109.
113. Ibid., para 91.
114. Case C-406/04, De Cuyper, [2006] ECR I-6947; Hendrix, cited supra note 30; Case
C-228/07, Petersen, [2008] ECR I-6989.
115. Wawrzyniak is not wholly unprecedented. In principle, a person shall enjoy the
unemployment benefits of theMember Statewhere he or shewas last employed, that State being
bound to acknowledge periods of insurance or employment completed elsewhere. Given that
Mrs Chateignier never worked in Belgium, that State was not competent. Under certain
conditions, Belgium however declared itself competent for Belgian nationals who last worked
elsewhere and assimilated their periods of employment to Belgian periods of insurance against
the risk of unemployment; since this benevolence covered foreigners only insofar as provided in
an international convention, Mrs Chateignier, a French national, fell outside its scope. Such
distinction constitutes a directly discriminatory restriction in breach of the right to equal
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3.1. The opt-out as a prima facie obstacle to the free movement of
persons?
Of course, the Wawrzyniak test applies only to domestic measures which
amount to prima facie obstacles in need of justification. Which rules of the
non-competent Member State must be qualified as such? A broad range of
requirements hinder the access to benefits of a Member State lacking
competence. Some rules are wholly unconnected to migration, and affect
persons insured in aMember State, be it pursuant to the national conflict rules
or pursuant to the Regulation, in the same fashion as persons in respect of
whom that State is not competent. These “internal” rules neither constitute a
prima facie restriction to free movement nor infringe any provision of the
Regulations. The kinship and age conditions for child benefits are examples
thereof.
The national anti-overlapping and exclusivity rules concern only those who
have access to the social security scheme of another Member State. The
German rule at issue inWawrzyniakwas considered an obstacle “in so far as it
appears to require, . . . not a reduction in the amount of the benefit by the
amount of that of a comparable benefit received in another State, but exclusion
from that benefit”.116 This means that anti-overlapping rules which merely
discount the national benefit by the amount of the foreign one do not raise an
obstacle, and accordingly may be enforced.117 “Disentitling” anti-overlapping
rules and exclusivity rules, which produce the same effect, raise an obstacle to
free movement which may however be justified.
In between those two extremes are rules which delineate the international
field of application of a social security scheme while affecting both insured
and uninsured persons. For instance, often benefits are granted only to persons
who reside or work in the country at a certain point in time or did so for a
certain period.The same is true for conditions regarding the payment of social
treatment on grounds of nationality of work-seekers under Art. 3(1) Regulation 1408/71 and
Art. 39(2) EC (Art. 45(2) TFEU) (Case C-346/05, Chateignier, [2006] ECR I-10951). Ms
Kaske found herself in a rather similar position; the main difference for our purposes lies in the
fact that the Austrian legislation benefited persons who last worked in another State on
condition that they had resided or habitually stayed in Austria for a total of at least 15 years
before their last employment abroad. The condition was found to be indirectly discriminatory
under Art. 48 EEC Treaty (now 45 TFEU) (Case C-277/99, Kaske, [2002] ECR I-1261). Both
cases are ill-suited for extrapolation since the ECJ was entirely oblivious to the issue of
competence.
116. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 76.
117. Such rules result in the grant of a supplement when the benefits of the non-competent
Member State exceed those of the competent Member State. They may interest those Member
States wishing to participate in the new system to a certain extent only, but fall short of
constituting an opt-out.
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security contributions. Whether they are caught by the prohibition against
obstacles, has yet to be clarified.118
The importance of such “external” provisions should not be
underestimated. If all limits to the international field of application of the
social security schemes of non-competent Member States were waived in the
name of the free movement of persons, parents raising children under 18
would be able to simultaneously claim (tax-financed) family benefits in most,
if not all, Member States.
MrWawrzyniak incurred a disadvantage corresponding to the discrepancy
in amount between the Polish child benefit, around ¤12 per month, and the
German benefit amounting to ¤154 monthly. The question whether Mr
Wawrzyniak truly encountered a restriction to his free movement rights merits
closer scrutiny and further study, since migrating did not influence his or his
family members’ legal position at all.119
In any case, the ECJ deviates from its habit of narrowing the interests of the
workers in the determination of the applicable legislation to the avoidance of
positive and negative conflicts of laws and administrative complications:120
the actual content of the applicable legislation, i.e. the social security rights
118. The ECJ considered a past residence condition as incompatible with the free
movement rights of workers in Kaske (cited supra note 115).
119. It could be argued that the disadvantagewas not discriminatory in nature.The principle
of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality only prohibits distinctions between persons in
comparable situations. In the field of social security law, the comparability test adopts a
particular form: the comparator of a migrant person is a sedentary person who is insured in the
same Member State and possesses the same relevant features (Pennings, “Co-ordination of
social security on the basis of the State-of-employment principle: Time for an alternative?”,
(2005) CMLRev., 80–82;Opinion ofA.G.Mazák inBosmann, cited supra note 3, paras. 77–81;
Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-212/06, Government of the French Community and
Walloon Government v. Flemish Government (hereinafter “Flemish care insurance”), [2008]
ECR I-1683, paras. 76–79). Hence MrWawrzyniak must be compared to all workers employed
and insured in Poland. Since a person is not comparable to persons insured in another Member
State, by definition the principle of non-discrimination laid down in the Regulation cannot be
relied upon to gain access to the social security schemes of a Member State which is not
competent.Art. 45(2)TFEU also grantsMrWawrzyniak only a right to non-discriminationwith
reference to workers employed in Poland, not Germany. In Finalarte, the ECJ held that, since
they do not seek access to the labour market of the host State and they return to their country of
origin or residence after completion of their work, posted workers cannot invoke Art. 48 EEC
(now 45 TFEU) against the first State (Joined Cases C-49, 50, 52–54 & 68–71/98, Finalarte,
[2001] ECR I-7831, paras. 21–23. See Verschueren, “Cross-border workers in the European
internal market: Trojan horses for Member States’ labour and social security law?”, (2008)
International journal of comparative labour law and industrial relations, 173–177). By
acceding to the claims of MrWawrzyniak to equal treatment in the host State where the posting
employer does not incur any disadvantage (paras. 82–84), the ECJ might signal a shift towards
a more worker-oriented approach, at least where the freedom to provide services of the
employer is not at stake (see also Joined Cases C-307-309/09, Vicoplus, [2011] ECR I-453).
120. Jorens, op. cit. supra note 93, 180–181.
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and obligations, enters the field of vision of the judicial review of the
enforceability of (at least some) conflict rules.
3.2. The intensity of review and grounds of justification
Any rule hindering freemovementmay be justified on public interest grounds.
The traditional justification and proportionality test cannot be applied as such
to a national rule which reflects both the letter (Art. 13(1) Regulation 1408/71
and Ten Holder) and, arguably, the spirit of European social security
coordination (the inherent argument). It seems that the new test developed in
Baumbast, De Cuyper, Hendrix, Petersen and Wawrzyniak is a variation
thereupon, distinguished by compelling justification grounds and a lighter
intensity of review.
In Wawrzyniak, the ECJ began its answer to the questions pertaining to
enforceability of the German anti-overlapping rule by recalling that the
non-competent Member State has the power, but not the obligation to grant
benefits to uninsured persons and can thus in principle freely choose how to
take into account entitlement to comparable benefits accruing in the
competent Member State. The more interference of European law in the
legislation of the non-competent Member State, the less meaningful its
freedom to refuse to partake in the new system of social protection. The
endangered provisions are those that define the international field of
application of social security schemes, which constitute the only tailored
means to opt out; alternatives necessarily affect persons insured in that
Member State andwould therefore lower their levels of protection.The powers
of the non-competent Member States in matters of social security are thus
curtailed by the judge-made obligations imposed on them.121 Every European
duty, as a corollary, deprives the principle of exclusivity, as laid down in
Article 13(1) and the case law of the ECJ, of a part of its effet utile. That
principle, the value of which the ECJ consistently emphasizes,122 should
deploy its full effects in the absence of purely national rights worthy of
protection and exceptions expressly provided for in the Regulations. The
conflict rules at stake also pass the test of compliance with the Treaty.123 The
posting rule for employed persons is lauded by the ECJ as an instrument to
121. See also von Chamier-Glisczinski, cited supra note 25, para 63 and Opinion of A.G.
Mazák in Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 85.
122. See e.g. the case law cited in notes 7, 169 and 179. In its Wawrzyniak judgment, the
ECJ alluded to the lawfulness of the exclusivity principle, even when the applicable legislation
provides benefits inferior to the benefits of the same kind of another Member State (Hudzinski
andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, paras. 41–44).
123. Opinion of A.G. Mazák in Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, paras.
81–83.
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promote the freedom to provide services and the free movement of workers,
encouraging economic interpenetration and preventing administrative
complications for workers, undertakings and social security organizations
alike.124 Ruling on the application of the free movement provisions of the
Treaty to national provisions which mirror valid rules of Regulation 1408/71,
the ECJ has substantially lowered the intensity of review in order to pay due
regard to the autonomy of the European legislature;125 the provisions of the
Regulation created “at least a strong presumption in favour of upholding the
national territorial restrictions”.126 In Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak, the ECJ
underscores that the grant of the benefit to the claimants would not be “liable
to affect disproportionately the predictability and effectiveness of the
application of the coordination rules of Regulation No 1408/71”.127
European obligations stemming from the Regulation and/or the TFEU
generate frictions with the neutral character of EU social security
coordination,128 which are neither redeemed by the Petroni principle nor by
the principle of non-discrimination. In both von Chamier-Glisczinski and
Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits), the ECJ’s refusal to
impose duties on the non-competent Member State exceeding those derived
from Bosmann was largely based on that consideration. The Petroni principle
supports an unrestricted right to opt out of the new regime and opposes any
intervention of European law in the social security affairs of the
non-competent Member State. It shields the purely national rights of the
competentMember State from any interference by European law:
“[s]o long as a worker is receiving a pension by virtue of national legislation
alone, the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 do not prevent the national
legislation, including the national rules against the overlapping of benefits,
from being applied to him in its entirety, provided that if the application of
124. Case 35/70, Manpower, [1970] ECR 1251, para 10; Fitzwilliam, cited supra note 7,
para 28;Plum, cited supra note 7, para 19. See alsoHudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note
1, para 82.
125. De Cuyper, cited supra note 114; Hendrix, cited supra note 30, para 55; von
Chamier-Glisczinski, cited supra note 25, in particular paras. 64–65, 86–87; Commission v.
Germany (long-term care benefits), cited supra note 25, in particular para 54.
126. Dougan, “Expanding the frontiers of Union citizenship by dismantling the territorial
boundaries of the national welfare states?” in Barnard and Odudu (Eds.), The Outer Limits of
European Union Law (Hart Publishing, 2009), p. 144.
127. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 67.
128. The ECJ explained that the disadvantage caused by the German anti-overlapping rule
constitutes an obstacle contravening the free movement of workers “even if it can be explained
by the disparities in the social security legislation of the Member States which subsist despite
the existence of the coordinating rules laid down by EU law” (Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited
supra note 1, para 81; see also paras. 42–43).
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such national legislation proves less favourable than the application of the
rules [of the Regulation] those rules must . . . be applied.”129 (our emphasis)
Should the non-competent State be subject to obligations from which the
competent Member State is exempted?130 As to the principle of
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, it was argued above that, at least
in casu, that principle cannot be invoked against the non-competent Member
State.131 This should have a tangible effect on the intensity of review of the
proportionality assessment: direct discrimination is scrutinized with the
greatest care and severity,132 while the ECJ ismore restrained in its assessment
of the proportionality of genuinely non-discriminatory obstacles.133
The so-called “real link” became the most meaningful justification ground
during the past decade. It rests on the idea thatMember States can legitimately
exclude persons from their welfare system whose link with their labour
market, social security system or society is too tenuous. Conversely, persons
having such a link should in principle gain access to their social security
scheme. Conceived in the citizenship case law concerning welfare benefits
falling outside the scope of the Regulation,134 the “real link” justification grew
to cover situations governed by the Regulation as a corollary of the increased
permeability of the Regulation to the direct application of the TFEU.135 First,
the Member State must show that the contested benefit is an expression of
solidarity which consequently can be restricted to a solidaristic community.136
Once that hurdle is cleared, the claimant must establish that he or she is a
member of that community. Of course, some benefits are solely an expression
of solidarity, such as pure social assistance, while others are only linked to
economic activity, such as occupational pensions. Social security benefits are
to be located somewhere in between those two extremes, depending on a set of
variables including their “social purpose, applicable qualifying criteria,
129. Case 22/77,Mura I, [1977] ECR 1699, operative part; Case 37/77,Greco, [1977] ECR
1711, operative part; Case 98/77, Schaap I, [1978] ECR 707, para 10. See also Case 26/78,
Viola, [1978] ECR 1771; Case C-5/91,Di Prinzio, [1992] ECR I-897, paras. 16–18 and the case
law cited. This is now codified in Art. 52 Regulation 883/2004.
130. This argument loses some strength with respect to family benefits, since the line of
case law started in Laterza lifts the boundary of the purely national rights (Laterza, cited supra
note 36).
131. See note 119 supra.
132. E.g. Chateignier, cited supra note 115.
133. Spaventa, FreeMovement of Persons in the European Union: Barriers to Movement in
their Constitutional Context (Kluwer Law International, 2007), pp. 85–86, 99.
134. E.g. Case C-224/98, D’Hoop, [2002] ECR I-6191.
135. E.g. Case C-138/02, Collins, [2004] ECR I-2703; Hendrix, cited supra note 30; Case
C-503/09, Stewart, judgment of 12 July 2011, nyr.
136. Dougan, op. cit. supra note 126, pp. 150–157. See e.g. Hendrix, cited supra note 30,
para 55. The ECJ somewhat cryptically alluded to the nature of the benefit in Hudzinski and
Wawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 65.
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chosen method of funding, and indeed [their] perception within the relevant
society”.137 For our purposes, this means that the stronger the solidarity
component of a benefit, the stronger the case for finding proportionality in the
refusal to grant a benefit by the non-competent Member State. The contested
child benefits seem to hold the middle ground of the spectrum. Given the
horizontal reach of the Bosmann regime and in the absence of any indications
to the contrary, it must be assumed that Wawrzyniak equally covers all social
security benefits.138 The strength of the non-competent State’s claim to
opt-out of the new regime should fluctuate somewhat according to the nature
of the benefit.
The rules of the non-competent Member State delineating its international
field of application are undoubtedly justified. Most arguments are
institutional and apply with equal force regardless of the facts of the case.
They can be condensed into two ideas: the lawful and applicableArticle 13(1)
Regulation 1408/71 must be treated with due deference and the lack of access
to the benefits of the non-competent Member States is inherent in a system of
coordination which does not have the ambition to harmonize social security
laws.The strength of other grounds of justification may depend on the facts of
the case. Taken together, all arguments lead to a strong, but rebuttable
presumption that the non-competent State’s opt-out is proportionate.
3.3. The proportionality review
Other arguments tilt the balance in the other direction, bolstering the case for
the grant of benefits.Wawrzyniak creates a new space for the acknowledgment
of the personal circumstances of the worker and his or her employer.
Admittedly, in that case the proportionality test was not clearly articulated and
only a limited number of circumstances were taken into account; however, the
capacity of the ECJ to discount an argumentation based on other
circumstances, subsumed in an in concreto application of the principle of
proportionality, may be seriously doubted.139 Since the benefits at stake in
Wawrzyniak can be restricted to a solidaristic community, the burden of proof
shifts to the individual who must demonstrate his or her membership of that
community. In Hendrix, the ECJ attached a decisive significance to the
circumstance that the claimant had kept all of his economic and social links to
his Member State of origin. InWawrzyniak, the ECJ dealt with the question of
137. Dougan, op. cit. supra note 126, pp. 155–156.
138. In Kaske and Chateignier, both cited supra note 115, the ECJ used an analogous
approach in the field of unemployment benefits.
139. The ECJ imposed the requirement of proportionality to a State lacking competence in
Chateignier, cited supra note 115, para 32.
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the real link in a somewhat subdued way. The fact that Mr Wawrzyniak
seemingly contributed to the funding of the benefit through income tax made
the incurred disadvantage appear “even less justifiable”.140The importance of
this proprietary dimension is exemplified by the ECJ’s increasing hostility to
the payment of social security contributions on which there is no return.141
The ECJ might have considered the contribution to the funding as indicatory
of a real link, as it did in Commission v. the Netherlands and Caves Krier
Frères.142 Besides, it is settled case law – but was not repeated in the
Wawrzyniak case – that an economic contribution143 to the host State
constitutes a link sufficiently close to allow for the exportability of the
benefit.144 The existence of a sufficiently close link remains controversial, for
the ECJ seems to require a certain permanency of the link, which Mr
Wawrzyniak probably fell short of achieving even though he only claimed
benefits for the period of posting (February to December 2006); an economic
contribution as a posted person does not equal that of a person who is fully
integrated in the labour market of the host Member State; and his connection
to Germany was in any case outshone by the solid links he had with Poland.
While it is true that the ECJ did not directly engage with the issue of the real
link inWawrzyniak, it would struggle to resist an argumentation based on that
notion: the real link increasingly permeates through the Regulations.145
The oft-repeated objective of the principle of exclusivity is to avoid the
administrative difficulties flowing from the duplication of legislations.146 The
Nonnenmacher case law necessitated the particularly difficult determination
of the so-called additional advantage. Granting a supplementary benefit toMr
Wawrzyniak did not entail major administrative problems.147After reiterating
that the rationale of the posting rules lies in the freedom to provide services,
140. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 78. The ECJ also hinted at the real
linkwhen it described the subjection to tax liability as a “sufficiently close” connection between
the situations at issue and the German territory with regard to benefits financed through tax
revenue (Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 66).
141. E.g. Leyman and da Silva Martins, both cited supra note 25.
142. Case C-542/09, Commission v. Netherlands, judgment of 14 June 2012, nyr, para 66;
Case C-379/11, Caves Krier Frères, judgment of 13 Dec. 2012, nyr, para 53; Devetzi, op. cit.
supra note 88, 451. See also, more generally, Dougan, op. cit. supra note 126, pp. 152–153 and
Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Hendrix, cited supra note 30, para 66.
143. On marginal employment, see Case C-213/05, Geven, [2007] ECR I-6347.
144. Case C-57/96, Meints, [1997] ECR 6689; Case C-35/97, Commission v. France
(supplementary retirement pension points), [1998] ECR I-5325; Case C-212/05, Hartmann,
[2007] ECR I-6303; Commission v. Netherlands and Caves Krier Frères, both cited supra note
142.
145. See the cases referred to in note 135 supra.
146. See supra note 14.
147. That seemed also to be the case with regard to Mrs Bosmann and Mr Hudzinski. See,
with regard to the Bosmann case, Van der Mei and Essers, op. cit. supra note 51, 965.
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the ECJ insisted that the German refusal was not aimed at preventing costs and
administrative complications for undertakings employing posted workers in
Germany, since no such drawbacks arose in the present case.148
Whether the ECJ struck the right balance between individual rights and
collective responsibilities is open for discussion.The contrast between the von
Chamier-Glisczinski andWawrzyniak cases is instructive.149Against the sheer
number of arguments supporting an application of the anti-overlapping rule,
one can oppose MrWawrzyniak’s capacity of economically active person, his
contribution to the funding of the benefit through income tax liability and the
lack of administrative complications. The outcome is strongly supported by
the general principle of equality, which the ECJ however failed to
investigate.150 The problem rather stems from the fact that it is most unclear
what weight must be ascribed to each factor. For instance, if the lack of
administrative difficulties is sufficient when taken in isolation to overrule an
opt-out, the balance would be skewed.
In von Chamier-Glisczinski, the ECJ refrained from applying the Baumbast
test. It examined the conformity of the disadvantage suffered by Mrs von
Chamier-Glisczinski by reason of her move to a care home inAustria with the
free movement rights conferred on her by Article 18(1) EC. However, it did
not perform a proportionality assessment. The ECJ instead based its
conclusion on the powers of the Member States, the validity of the applicable
provisions of secondary law and the neutral character of EU social security
law. What if the Baumbast test had been applied? Beneath the apparent
148. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, paras. 82–84.
149. A comparison with Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits), cited supra
note 25 is more difficult, given the nature of infringement proceedings, while the ECJ’s neglect
of the competence question in Kaske and Chateignier makes them less suitable for such
exercise.
150. In the context of family benefits, the principle of exclusivity does not deploy its full
effects. Arts. 76–79 Regulation 1408/71 and Art. 10 Regulation 574/72 govern primarily the
concurrence of entitlements to family benefits in the Member State of employment of the
parents and the Member State of residence, and organize plurality of applicable legislation.
They vest one State with primary competence; if the other State grants benefits at a higher level,
it is bound to supplement the lower benefits up to the level of its own benefits. The guarantee of
the highest benefits is limited to the situations envisaged by the above provisions. In Dammer,
the ECJ expressed its dissatisfaction with this boundary by granting a supplement to persons
who could not invoke the protection of these provisions (Case C-168/88,Dammer, [1989] ECR
4553). Bosmann and Hudzinski extend it to situations where a purely national right exists in a
non-competentMember State.TheWawrzyniak case could be read in the same light: equality as
a general principle of law opposes a distinction between persons having links with more than
one Member State based on whether their situation fits within the framework of the relevant
provisions of the Regulation, even if that distinction ultimately rests on the very nature of the
Petroni principle. While it is regrettable that this argument is absent from the ECJ’s reasoning,
theBosmann andHudzinski andWawrzyniak cases contribute to filling a lacuna by generalizing
the supplement.
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differences with the circumstances in Wawrzyniak, a certain resemblance is
hidden: Mr and Mrs von Chamier-Glisczinski did contribute to the financing
of the contested care benefit through their sickness benefit contributions; they
maintained a link with the German social security scheme;151 and the
reimbursement of their care costs would not have entailed insurmountable
administrative difficulties or additional contributions. Moreover,
the argument derived from the separation of powers lacks cogency since the
inclusion of long-term care benefits in the chapter on sickness benefits was
the work of the ECJ, not of the European legislature.152 Finally, as Advocate
General Mengozzi demonstrated, the Kohll and Vanbraekel line of case law
also furthers her case.153That is not to say that the ECJ should necessarily have
reached a different conclusion in either case,154 but the fact that the difference
in outcome remains unexplained adds to the confusion.
In general, both cases would have benefited from a more elaborate
reasoning.Amongst other things, the ECJ should either rootWawrzyniakmore
explicitly in the Baumbast jurisprudence and make the proportionality
principle more prominent, or explain what distinguishes the two cases. In both
Wawrzyniak and von Chamier-Glisczinski, the real link merits a clearer
articulation. The ECJ inWawrzyniak attached significance to a select number
of personal circumstances of the claimant and his employer.While it did not as
such require an in concreto proportionality assessment on the basis of all
potentially relevant characteristics of the benefit, the claimant and, where
relevant, his employer, the ECJ ventures on a slippery slope: if no personalized
proportionality test is to be carried out, it is incumbent upon it to explain
why.155 The arguments in favour of a choice of the non-competent Member
State might usefully be invoked for that purpose.
151. On the relevance thereof, see Stewart, cited supra note 135, paras. 97–100.
152. Molenaar, cited supra note 62.
153. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in von Chamier-Glisczinski, cited supra note 25; Kohll,
cited supra note 57; Vanbraekel, cited supra note 49. See also Commission v. Germany
(long-term care benefits), cited supra note 25; and see note 49 supra.
154. E.g. the difference between economic and non-economic freedoms could underlie this
discrepancy: neither the Regulation norArt. 18(1) EC allowedMrs von Chamier-Glisczinski to
claim a right to non-discrimination in comparison to persons insured in Germany and staying in
a care home there. Also, one cannot exclude that von Chamier-Glisczinski would have been
decided differently anno 2013, although Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits),
cited supra note 25, suggests the opposite.
155. Contrast Bidar and Förster (Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119; Case
C-158/07, Förster, [2008] ECR I-8507).
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3.4. Secondary legislation
Another outstanding issue is which rules set a standard binding the
non-competentMember State. It is clear that the other freemovement rights of
the TFEU can trigger the Wawrzyniak rule. The effect of certain pieces of
secondary legislation has yet to be settled.
There is no doubt that Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 are implicitly, if
not explicitly, directed at the competent Member State only. Will the ECJ
accept that they do not impose any obligations on non-competent Member
States?156
The provisions of Directive 2004/38 apply to the Member State of
residence, regardless of its competence under Regulation 883/2004. Subject
to certain conditions and limitations, Article 24 Directive 2004/38 grants all
Union citizens residing in the host Member State a right to be treated equally
to the nationals of that State. Could that rule be relied upon to waive an opt-out
of a State in which a person resides but which lacks competence?157 The
answer to this question depends on the relationship between the Directive and
the social security Regulations.158 More specifically, how does Article 24
Directive 2004/38 (jeopardizing opt-outs) correlate to the principle of
exclusivity laid down in Article 11(1) Regulation 883/2004 (protecting
opt-outs)? A compromise would be to require non-competent Member States
to justify a derogation fromArticle 24, while conceding them a presumption of
proportionality in order to give effect to Article 11.
4. Contribution duties and other disadvantages
Acceding to the social security system of aMember State lacking competence
can entail disadvantages. There is an undeniable need to devise a method to
deal with these burdens, and in particular the issue of contribution duties.
Burdens might result in net losses for the migrant. This would defeat the free
movement rationale underlying the Bosmann and Hudzinski andWawrzyniak
cases. The German child benefit at issue in those cases was financed solely by
tax income. While tax revenue is increasingly used to finance social security
expenses, most benefits are, at least partly, financed through social security
contributions. Tax and social security contributions are treated in a
156. In Hendrix, von Chamier-Glisczinski and Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak, the Court
examined the opt-out in the light of the Regulations. It is unclear whether the Court thereby
merely sought to establish that the defendant institution belonged to a Member State lacking
competence, or instead used the Regulations as a yardstick for the opt-out measures.
157. See Coucheir et al., op. cit. supra note 99, 9 and 26–29.
158. The Court might shed some light on this issue in Case C-140/12, Brey, pending.
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fundamentally different way in European internal market law, which probably
will reverberate on the reach of the new regime of social protection.
Competence under the Regulations is no longer an absolute requirement for
entitlement; is it always a precondition for the collection of contributions?The
issue is as delicate as it is important: at stake are the free movement rights of
the insured person, those of his employer and the institution’s interest in
securing durable funding of its expenses. Neither inBosmann nor inHudzinski
andWawrzyniak did the ECJ take a stance on this, since no disadvantage arose.
In the latter case, the ECJ recalled that the provision on the posting of workers
is aimed to facilitate the freedom to provide services of the posting
undertaking. It explained that this objective would not be frustrated by
granting the benefit toMrWawrzyniak, since that undertaking is neither liable
to contribute to the funding of the benefit nor subjected to any additional
administrative formalities.159 In this matter one should distinguish between
the Bosmann and Wawrzyniak routes to the social security systems of
non-competent States.
Contributions duties aremostly incompatiblewith the purely national rights
which Bosmann protects: since persons (and employers) do not pay any
contributions to the social security schemes of a State lacking competence,
they fail to meet the conditions of national law.This may be different when the
State in question is competent in general to levy contributions for the relevant
branch of social security, but not to award the claimed benefit. This is
illustrated by the care benefits in kind at stake in von Chamier-Glisczinski and
Commission v.Germany (long-term care benefits).Another scenario concerns
the situation of aMember State that lost competence relatively recently, where
a personmight have paid sufficient contributions before being subjected to the
legislation of another State. Sometimes foreign contributions are credited to a
person by virtue of national law only.160 Most often, Bosmann will thus
concern non-contributory benefits. Bosmann does not overrule Ten Holder
inasmuch as the non-competent Member State is still prevented from levying
contributions.161
The relationship between theWawrzyniakmechanism and disadvantages is
particularly opaque.The most plausible options would be either to restrict that
mechanism to non-contributory benefits, or to fit the disadvantages within the
framework of the test outlined above. Pre-Bosmann, the prohibitive effect of
the European conflict rules covered the benefit-side of social security (Ten
159. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, paras. 82–84.
160. E.g. Kaske and Chateignier, both cited supra note 115.
161. Van der Mei and Essers, op. cit. supra note 51, 965;Van der Mei, “Overview of recent
cases before the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice (April –
June 2012)”, (2012) EJSS, 203.
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Holder) and its contribution-side (Perenboom).Wawrzyniak lifts the exclusive
effect with respect to the former side only. The ECJ’s first option would be to
maintain that effect with respect to contribution duties. Just as with the
Bosmann system, the non-competent Member State would be stripped of the
power to collect contributions in the absence of an express mandate of the
Regulations. Apart from the situation of the formerly competent State, the
partially competent State and the aggregating State outlined above,
theWawrzyniak system would be confined to non-contributory benefits. This
optionwould find support amongst scholars162 and in the ECJ’s case law;163 in
a judgment following the Hudzinski andWawrzyniak cases, the ECJ held that
liability to pay double social security contributions would be “manifestly
contrary to the objectives of Regulation No 1408/71”.164
Alternatively, the ECJ could frame the issue of the disadvantages within the
proportionality test, which by its very nature applies only when not gaining
access to the social security system of the non-competent Member State
places the individual at a net disadvantage. Two clusters of redoubtable
difficulties would come into being. In the first place, the determination of the
“net advantage” is bound to be fraught with problems.165 Even if there is such
an advantage, can a person invoke the proportionality principle (i) to acquire
a right to contribute, perhaps retroactively, to the scheme of a State lacking
competence, (ii) to coerce his or her employer into contributing to such a
162. Van der Mei, ibid., 203.
163. Commission v. France (CRDS), paras. 45–48 andCommission v. France (CSG), paras.
42–45, both cited supra note 11; see alsoHudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, paras.
82–84.
164. Partena, cited supra note 2, para 54. The statement is not conclusive, since the context
is completely different and the ECJ reasoned on a high level of abstraction which did not allow
the impact of the possible existence of an additional advantage to be taken into account.
165. Under a cost-benefit approach, the calculation of the net advantage depends on the
uncertain materialization of the risk, the (changing) circumstances of the person and the
(changing) laws of the Member States concerned (on the Nonnenmacher rule, see Voirin,
“Salariés travaillant sur le territoire d’un État membre autre que celui où il réside: Accident du
trajet: cumul ou non cumul:Annotation to Case 19/67, van derVecht”, (1968)Droit social, 487
andVan derMei and Essers, op. cit. supra note 51, 960–961).Alternatively, inspiration could be
drawn fromA.G. Sharpston, who opined that affiliation to the Flemish care insurance is a net
advantage, since it must be assumed that the Flemish Government intended it as a benefit rather
than a burden and since, while some will not benefit directly, everyone benefits potentially
(Opinion in Flemish care insurance, cited supra note 119, paras. 68–70). While it would be
operational, this presumption would unduly downplay the importance of disadvantages in the
Wawrzyniak system. Finally, leaving the person concerned to decide whether the advantage
outweighs the disadvantages would sit uneasily with the nature of European and national social
security law (e.g. Case 12/67, Guissart, [1967] ECR (English spec.ed.) 433; Case 58/87,
Rebmann, [1988] ECR 3467, para 9; Aldewereld, cited supra note 11, paras. 15–20; van Delft,
cited supra note 25, in particular paras. 52–54; Jorens, op. cit. supra note 93, 181–183).
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scheme, or even (iii) to contest the very enforceability of a contribution duty,
where such contributions have been paid in the competent State?
Bosmann is by its very nature contained by contribution duties. As to
Wawrzyniak, whichever option the ECJ favours, the presence of contribution
duties will have the effect of substantially limiting the scope of the new regime
of social protection, since most benefits are, at least partly, financed through
social security contributions.166 The ECJ seems well aware thereof.167 The
Beveridgean and Scandinavian countries rely relatively heavily on tax revenue
and will be most affected by Bosmann and Wawrzyniak.
5. Conclusion
Since the origin of EU social security law, the ECJ has used the Treaties to
impose obligations on the competent Member States in order to facilitate the
free movement of persons. In the last fifteen years, it has experimented with
novel models of hierarchy of norms for that sake. Most notable are the impact
of the free movement of services upon the coordination of sickness benefits
and that of EU citizenship on the fields of unemployment benefits and
SNCBs. The ECJ now takes a further step by revising the privileged status of
the Member States lacking competence.
Nonnenmacher was the first stage in the ECJ’s continuous search for a
balance between the exclusivity principle and the establishment of the greatest
possible freedom of movement for migrant citizens. The latter interest, which
is an objective of Article 48 TFEU, is often, but not always, served by an
uncompromising exclusivity of the applicable legislation. Ten Holder
established a strict exclusivity principle, according to which other objectives
of EU social security law, such as legal certainty, the interests of employers
(freedom to provide services) and institutions and respect for the prerogatives
of the European legislature, are slightly prioritized over the free movement
objective. The balance is now tilted to the other side. In a mere few years, the
legal status of the non-competent State underwent radical change: for decades,
a Member State was prevented from granting social security benefits to
citizens for whom it was not competent; recently, it was allowed to do so, but
not compelled; nowadays, that State may, under certain circumstances, even
be obliged to award benefits. The citizens have an increasingly strong claim to
protection under the social security systems of countries with which they have
166. SNCBs and most family benefits are tax-financed. See also the three exceptions
mentioned in the paragraph accompanying notes 160 and 161.
167. E.g. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, paras. 82–84.
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a connection, even when that connection is not formalized as “competence”
within the meaning of the Regulation.
What, then, is the current legal value of the principle of exclusivity? That
principle and the new system of social protection relate as communicating
vessels. UnlessBosmann orWawrzyniak is applicable or a special provision of
the Regulation expressly spreads the competence among more than one State,
the legislation of one and only one Member State must be applied, even when
“those benefits are less favourable than the benefits of the same kind provided
for by [the legislation of the non-competent Member State]”.168 That is the
signal that the ECJ sent by reaffirming the lasting value of the exclusivity
principle in the cases where it was heavily contested169 and subsequent
judgments.170
Relying upon the freemovement provisions of theTFEU, the ECJ affords an
additional layer of social security protection to migrant citizens. National law,
the Regulation and the TFEU increasingly operate as complementary sources
of entitlements: each legal sphere sets a floor of rights upon which the others
may improve for the sake of themigrant’s interests.While this development so
far targeted the competent Member State, the ECJ devised a new mechanism
to allocate social security responsibility to some non-competent Member
States, while sparing others. This effectively amounts to a new system of
social security protection for migrants which rests on two pillars, both of
which reshape the constitutional relationship between the free movement
provisions of the TFEU on the one hand, and, on the other, secondary Union
legislation and national law.
First, entitlement can arise out of the unilateral will of each State. The ECJ
reinforces and extends the principle of inviolability of purely national rights;
to that extent, its rulings constitute a change in the understanding of the
doctrine of pre-emption in matters of European social security law. This has
the welcome effect of allowing all Member States, whether competent or not,
to takemeasures to protect migrants from the shortcomings of the Regulations
on a voluntary basis. The ECJ effectively organizes a transfer of power from
the European legislature, which is deprived of the possibility to enact an
absolute principle of exclusivity, to the Member States, who can, at their own
discretion, maintain exclusivity or tolerate a certain plurality. In doing so, the
ECJ kept the best interests of migrant European citizens at heart, without
compromising legal certainty or the powers of theMember States.Bosmann is
168. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, cited supra note 1, para 44.
169. Hudzinski andWawrzyniak, ibid., paras. 41, 44, 67, 82–84; Bosmann, cited supra note
3, paras. 16, 17; Commission v. Germany (long-term care benefits), and von Chamier-
Glisczinski, both cited supra note 25.
170. Partena, cited supra note 2, paras. 45, 47 & 54; Format, cited supra note 7, para 29;
Dumont de Chassart, cited supra note 25, para 38.
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moreover consonant with the notion of the real link: it is hard to argue that a
personmeeting all conditions for the payment of benefits under the legislation
of a Member State would not have a sufficiently close link to that State.
In Bosmann, the ECJ unlocked the gate to the social security system of
States lacking competence, leaving the keys in the hands of those States.
Wawrzyniak shows that the ECJ keeps a master key, the proportionality
principle, in order to help some migrants: the TFEU can impose a duty to
partake in the new regime against the will of Member States, which hit a
boundary in von Chamier-Glisczinski and Commission v. Germany
(long-term care benefits). Wawrzyniak is not so much a deepening or
denaturation of Bosmann as a complement thereto. The constitutional
significance of Wawrzyniak relates to the indirect legal review of the
proportionality of provisions of secondary European law introduced in
Baumbast. That test, which in the field of social security had previously been
applied only to the question of portability of benefits,171 now also governs the
exclusivity principle. One may expect it to spread further in the context of the
social security regulations and beyond: potentially, it could apply to every
situation in which the TFEU would be more mobility-friendly than secondary
legislation.172 InWawrzyniak, just as in Hendrix and Petersen, the ECJ let its
citizenship case law inform, and indeed alter, its reading of the free movement
of workers.
The test starts from the premiss that the new regime is in principle optional
for Member States. Institutional reasons ground a presumption of
proportionality, which may however be rebutted by elements pertaining to the
situation of the individual. The relative similarity between the relevant
circumstances of MrWawrzyniak and Mrs von Chamier-Glisczinski makes it
clear that the ECJ has a long way to go in shedding light on the respective
weight of these individual circumstances, let alone separating the sufficient
and necessary elements from the irrelevant ones in collaboration with the
national courts.
Extending the reach of the indirect judicial review conceived in Baumbast
entails both opportunities and risks. It could be used to refine the sometimes
blunt regulatory framework of the Regulations by conditioning the application
of some of its provisions to the safeguard of proportionality. The main added
value of a personalized proportionality test thus lies in its coutribution to
fairness.173 However, by making the application of national rules without
171. De Cuyper, cited supra note 114; Hendrix, cited supra note 30; Petersen, cited supra
note 114.
172. See also Dougan, op. cit. supra note 110, 615, 633–639.
173. See also Dougan and Spaventa, “Educating Rudy and the (non-)english patient: A
double-bill on residency rights under Article 18 EC”, (2003) EL Rev., 706.
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discretionary powers contingent upon the individual circumstances of each
claimant, the ECJ compromises legal certainty: this test adds a layer of
complexity to a field of law which is already notorious for its inaccessibility.
As to the competing interests outlined above, muchwill depend on the balance
which the ECJ strikes in further case law.
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